The Effective Use of the Audit Risk Model at the Account Level by Seidel, Timothy Andrew
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
ScholarWorks@UARK
Theses and Dissertations
8-2014
The Effective Use of the Audit Risk Model at the
Account Level
Timothy Andrew Seidel
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the Accounting Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu, ccmiddle@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation
Seidel, Timothy Andrew, "The Effective Use of the Audit Risk Model at the Account Level" (2014). Theses and Dissertations. 2261.
http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/2261
 
 
The Effective Use of the Audit Risk Model at the Account Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Effective Use of the Audit Risk Model at the Account Level 
  
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Timothy Seidel 
Brigham Young University 
Bachelor of Science in Business Management, 2001 
University of Notre Dame 
Master of Science in Accountancy, 2003 
 
 
 
August 2014 
University of Arkansas 
 
 
 
This dissertation is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council. 
 
 
_________________________________ 
Dr. Linda A. Myers 
Dissertation Director 
 
 
_________________________________ 
Dr. Gary F. Peters 
Committee Member 
 
 
_________________________________ 
Dr. Cory A. Cassell 
Committee Member 
_________________________________ 
Dr. Junhee Han 
Committee Member  
 
 
  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
      I examine whether auditors effectively respond to an assessment of high control risk at 
the account level.  The audit risk model assumes that auditors alter their audit procedures to 
compensate for a greater risk of material misstatement to maintain a low risk of audit failure (i.e., 
low audit risk).  I use internal control weakness disclosures in interim and annual filings to 
identify assessments of high control risk within specific accounts, and restatements of these 
specific accounts to identify account-level audit failures.  I find an increased incidence of 
account-level misstatements when control risk within that particular account is high, suggesting 
that, on average, auditors do not maintain a consistent level of audit risk at the account level in 
the presence of high control risk.  In further analyses, I examine whether the effectiveness of the 
auditor’s response varies as auditor effort (measured using excess audit fees) increases.  For 
certain accounts, I find that additional auditor effort mitigates the likelihood of an ineffective 
response to high control risk, but that this mitigating effect occurs only at high levels of auditor 
effort.  The results of this study provide insight into the effectiveness of auditors’ use of the audit 
risk model at the account level and suggest areas of the audit where auditors can improve the link 
between account-level risk assessments and the design, performance, and evaluation of 
substantive audit tests. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Auditing standards require that auditors plan and perform financial statement audits to 
provide reasonable assurance that amounts and disclosures in the financial statements are free of 
material misstatement.  Absolute assurance is not possible given the volume of transactions 
underlying companies’ financial statements, the complexity of companies’ operations, the 
potential for management fraud, the potential for auditor error, and time constraints for 
completing an annual audit.  Because of these constraints, auditors must accept some level of 
audit risk, defined as the risk that auditors will express an unqualified (clean) opinion on 
financial statements that are materially misstated.  Messier et al. (2012, 100) state that “while the 
auditor is ultimately concerned with audit risk at the financial statement level, as a practical 
matter audit risk must be considered at more detailed levels through the course of the audit, 
including the account balance, class of transaction, or disclosure level.”  In fact, auditing 
standards state that  
[t]he auditor needs to consider audit risk at the individual account-balance or class-
of-transactions level because such consideration directly assists him in determining 
the scope of auditing procedures for the balance or class. The auditor should seek 
to restrict audit risk at the individual balance or class level in such a way that will 
enable him, at the completion of his examination, to express an opinion on the 
financial statements taken as a whole at an appropriately low level of audit risk  
 
(AICPA 1983, 5-6).  
 
According to auditing standards, as the auditor’s assessment of the risk of material 
misstatement (comprised of inherent risk and control risk) increases, the auditor should alter the 
nature, timing, and extent of substantive audit procedures to restrict audit risk to the desired level 
(AICPA 1983, AICPA 1988, PCAOB 2010).1  Although research suggests that auditors adjust 
                                                            
1 Inherent risk is the susceptibility to a material misstatement assuming that there are no related 
internal control structure policies or procedures.  Control risk is the risk that a material 
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their effort in the presence of high control risk (Raghunandan and Rama 2006; Hogan and 
Wilkins 2008; Hoitash et al. 2008; Hoag and Hollingsworth 2011), whether additional auditor 
effort mitigates an ineffective response at the account balance or class of transactions level 
(hereafter referred to as the account level) has not been previously documented.  In addition, 
prior research does not link actual misstatements to internal control weaknesses at the account 
level where auditors not only make risk assessments, but also design their substantive audit 
procedures.  During audit firm inspections, regulators continue to find instances where 
substantive audit procedures are not aligned appropriately with the auditors’ risk assessments.  In 
December 2012, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) released a report 
discussing their findings and observations related to audits of internal control over financial 
reporting.  The report states that “inspections staff have observed instances in which firms failed 
to determine appropriately the effect that identified control deficiencies had on the nature, 
timing, and extent of their substantive procedures to reduce audit risk in the audit of the financial 
statements to an appropriately low level” (PCAOB 2012, 14).  Additionally, recent peer reviews 
of nonpublic company audits reveal that audit firms may be struggling to properly assess and 
document risk, and adjust audit work plans accordingly.  One of the most common areas of non-
compliance noted by peer reviewers is the failure to assess and adjust for risk at the account level 
(Hood 2013).  To the extent that auditors fail to modify substantive audit procedures in the 
presence of high control risk, audit quality can suffer.2  
                                                            
misstatement that could occur will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis by the entity’s 
internal control structure policies or procedures (AICPA 1983). 
2 Audit quality can be defined as the joint probability of detecting and reporting material 
misstatements (DeAngelo 1981).   
 3 
 
In this study, I examine whether auditors effectively respond to an assessment of high 
control risk at the account level.  The audit risk model assumes that auditors alter their audit 
procedures to compensate for a greater risk of material misstatement.  As such, I examine 
whether the auditor’s response to high control risk (i.e., the adjustment to detection risk 
accomplished by altering the nature, timing, and extent of substantive audit procedures) is 
effective in maintaining a consistent, low level of audit risk at the account level, where 
consistency is the similarity of account-level audit risk between companies with high account-
level control risk and those without.  In further analyses, I examine whether increased auditor 
effort (measured using excess audit fees) in response to an assessment of high control risk is 
effective in maintaining a consistent level of audit risk.   
To ensure that controls were actually tested and to allow time for misstatements to be 
revealed, my sample consists of accelerated filers from 2004 through 2009 inclusive.  I identify 
account-specific misstatements revealed through subsequent restatements.3  An account-level 
misstatement is an ex-post measure of audit failure for that particular account.  I measure 
account-level control risk assessments by identifying account-specific internal control 
weaknesses disclosed in quarterly or annual filings.  I use the categorizations in Audit Analytics 
to identify account-level misstatements and internal control material weaknesses.  I examine 
whether an auditor’s assessment of high account-level control risk affects the likelihood of an 
account-level misstatement.  An increased (decreased) likelihood of an account-level 
misstatement among companies with an assessment of high account-level control risk would 
suggest an insufficient (overcompensating) alteration of detection risk to maintain a consistent 
                                                            
3 Given that restatements are an indicator of a material weakness in internal controls, my 
analyses focus on misstated periods identified by a subsequent restatement rather than on the 
period of the restatement announcement. 
 4 
 
level of audit risk.  I find that for many of the companies with high control risk within specific 
accounts, auditors respond effectively (e.g., for each account grouping examined, less than 11 
percent of the observations with high control risk result in future restatements of those particular 
accounts).  Although many auditors respond effectively to assessments of high control risk at the 
account level, in general, I find an increased likelihood of account-level misstatements when 
control risk within that particular account is high.  This suggests that for most accounts, on 
average, auditors do not sufficiently alter detection risk to maintain a consistent level of audit 
risk at the account level in the presence of high control risk.    
I next examine whether increased auditor effort in response to an assessment of high 
control risk is effective in maintaining a consistent level of audit risk.  Using a procedure to 
capture excess audit fees related to account-level internal control weaknesses, I find evidence, 
for certain accounts considered routine or core to the on-going operations of the company that 
increased auditor effort in response to an assessment of high control risk is effective in 
maintaining a consistent level of audit risk at the account-level.  .4  Further analyses reveal, 
however, that this occurs only at high levels of auditor effort.  For other, more non-routine 
accounts, I find no evidence to suggest that additional auditor effort, as proxied by excess audit 
fees, in response to an assessment of high control risk, even at high levels, results in a consistent 
level of audit risk at the account level.   
In additional analysis, I explore why auditors do not effectively respond to an assessment 
of high control risk at the account level.  Understanding the factors that give rise to an ineffective 
response to an assessment of high control risk creates an awareness among auditors and 
                                                            
4 Consistent with Palmrose et al. (2004), core accounts are those that relate to the on-going 
operations of the company and include revenue, cost of sales, operating expenses and their 
related balance sheet accounts.   
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regulators and can lead to improvements in audit quality.  To conduct this analysis, I limit the 
sample to company-years with high control risk in at least one account grouping and I identify 
company-year observations with an account-level audit failure (i.e., a misstatement exists within 
an account with an assessment of high control risk).  I then examine what factors influence the 
likelihood of an account-level audit failure.  I find that client complexity, auditor-client 
misalignments for small auditors (presumably due to a lack of expertise or resources), the 
presence of an entity-level internal control weakness, and the timing of internal control weakness 
reporting (and presumably discovery) increase the likelihood of an ineffective response to an 
assessment of high control risk.  I also find that when the audit report date is close to the required 
filing deadline, and the company files on time, auditors are more likely to respond effectively to 
the assessment of high control risk, suggesting that the observed audit report delay is due to the 
auditors’ effective adjustments to the timing and extent of substantive audit procedures.     
This study contributes to prior literature in several ways.  Prior research examining the 
use of the audit risk model at the account level provides little evidence suggesting that auditors 
are responsive to account-level risks (see e.g., Bedard 1989; Mock and Wright 1993; Waller 
1993; Mock and Wright 1999).  However, these studies focus on adjustments to substantive audit 
procedures in the presence of risk factors and not the effectiveness of the audit procedures 
actually performed.  In addition, these studies tend to examine specific settings (e.g., particular 
accounts or time periods) with small samples.  This study contributes to this research by 
examining the effectiveness of auditors’ response to account-level control risk among a broad 
range of accounts in the current regulatory regime.  
Prior research examining auditors’ response to identified risk factors at the overall 
financial statement level find some evidence that auditors respond to internal control related risks 
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(see e.g., Raghunandan and Rama 2006; Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Hoitash et al. 2008; Hoag and 
Hollingsworth 2011; Lu et al. 2011).  However, as noted in a recent literature review of archival 
auditing research, “while audit fees increase in the presence of a wide array of risk factors, most 
studies are unable to distinguish whether the higher fees are due to more audit effort or simply a 
risk premium” (DeFond and Zhang 2013, 7).  Additionally, with the exception of Lu et al. 
(2011), these studies do not investigate whether the auditor response is effective in maintaining a 
consistent overall level of audit risk.  In fact, prior research finds evidence of lower financial 
reporting quality among companies with internal control weaknesses, suggesting that auditor 
effort in the presence of high control risk is not effective (see e.g., Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2008; Lu et al. 2011).  While Lu et al. (2011) provide some evidence at the overall 
financial statement level that higher audit fees may capture additional auditor effort, their results 
suggest that auditors’ response to assessments of high control risk is not entirely effective.  
Specifically, they find that although accrual quality in the presence of internal control 
weaknesses improves as audit fees increase, accrual quality is still lower relative to companies 
without internal control weaknesses.     
This study contributes to prior research by adding further insights into the effectiveness 
of the audit risk model at the account level, where auditors make risk assessments and design 
account-specific audit procedures.  Doyle et al. (2007) find that lower accrual quality is 
concentrated in companies with entity-level control weaknesses and not companies with account-
specific weaknesses only, suggesting that auditors may be effective at responding to assessments 
of high account-level control risk.  By directly linking account-specific internal control 
weaknesses and related account-specific misstatements I am able to identify ineffective auditor 
responses to assessments of high control risk.  Without this linkage, a failure in the audit risk 
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model is not apparent.  For example, if a company misstates revenue, an ineffective response to 
the risk assessment occurs when control risk is high for revenue, but not when control risk is 
high for another account.  In addition, because lower accrual quality does not necessarily indicate 
the existence of a material misstatement, I examine actual account-related misstatements (as 
revealed through subsequent restatements).  This study provides evidence that higher excess 
audit fees in the presence of high control risk within certain routine or core accounts lead to 
increased account-level audit quality.  This result suggests that, for these accounts, higher audit 
fees are the result of greater audit effort and such increases are effective at maintaining a 
consistent level of audit risk at the account-level.     
Finally, this study contributes to the literature by examining why auditors are not 
effective in adjusting substantive audit procedures in the presence of high control risk. Unlike 
Rice and Weber (2011) who examine determinants of why auditors fail to accurately assess 
internal control weaknesses, this study examines determinants of why auditors respond 
ineffectively to an assessment of high control risk (i.e., inadequate auditing of the particular 
financial statement account rather than inadequate auditing of the internal controls related to the 
account).  The results of this study should be informative to regulators and auditors.  The results 
provide insight into areas of the audit where additional effort is effective and where it is not.  The 
results also suggest areas of the audit where auditors can improve the link between account-level 
risk assessments and the design, performance and evaluation of substantive audit tests.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section II, I discuss the audit risk 
model, review related prior literature, and develop my hypotheses.  In Section III, I describe my 
research design.  In Section IV, I describe my sample selection procedures and discuss 
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descriptive statistics.  I discuss the multivariate results in Section V, additional analyses in 
Section VI, and provide concluding remarks in Section VII.   
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II. BACKGROUND, PRIOR LITERATURE, AND HYPOTHESES 
A. BACKGROUND OF THE AUDIT RISK MODEL 
The audit risk model and the risk-based audit approach evolved from statistical sampling 
techniques.  Elliott and Rogers (1972) introduced an audit approach using the statistical 
technique of hypothesis testing.  The model incorporates auditors’ judgments of audit risk, 
materiality and internal control.  In 1972, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) incorporated the Elliot and Rogers’ model into Appendix B of Statement of Audit 
Procedure 54, The Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Control (AICPA 1972).  In 1981, 
the AICPA issued Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 39, Audit Sampling, Materiality 
and Risk (AICPA 1981), which outlined the elements of the risk that the auditor would fail to 
detect a monetary error equal to the maximum tolerable amount.  Although the existence of 
inherent risk was recognized, it was not incorporated into the model until 1983, when the AICPA 
issued SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit (AICPA 1983).  The key 
modifications from the risk model in SAS No. 39 were the inclusion of inherent risk and the 
combination of analytical review risk and tests of details risk to form detection risk.   
The audit risk model, according to SAS No. 47, is as follows:  Audit Risk = Inherent Risk 
x Control Risk x Detection Risk.5  Although the audit risk model has its roots in statistical 
sampling, SAS No. 47 specifically states that “these components of audit risk may be assessed in 
quantitative terms such as percentages or in nonquantitative terms that range, for example from a 
minimum to a maximum” (AICPA 1983, 8).  In 1988, the AICPA issued SAS No. 55, 
Consideration of the Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit, which added 
                                                            
5 Inherent risk and control risk are defined in footnote 1.  Detection risk is “the risk that the 
auditor will not detect a material misstatement that exists in an assertion” (AICPA 1983). 
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additional insight into the audit risk components.  The guidance set forth in SAS No. 47 and 55 
form part of AU Section 312. 6  Because of difficulties with the application of the statistical audit 
risk model, practitioners shifted to the development and use of the audit risk model at a 
conceptual level.  According to Srivastava and Mock (2005, 1), although “early audit research 
and standard setting explored more rigorous guidance concerning statistical sampling, more 
recently audit practice has moved away from these approaches in favor of judgment sampling 
and relegating precise formulations of audit risk to providing ‘general guidance’ for audit 
planning.”  Similarly, according to the AICPA, the audit risk model “expresses the general 
relationship of the risks associated with the auditor’s assessment of inherent and control risks” 
and “is not intended to be a mathematical formula including all factors that may influence the 
determination of individual risk components” (AICPA 1992, AU 350.48).    
In 2002, the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) was signed into law, which created the PCAOB 
to oversee auditors of public companies.  Under Section 101 of the Act, the PCAOB was given 
authority to set auditing standards for publicly traded companies.  In April 2003, the PCAOB 
adopted certain preexisting standards as its interim standards.  These standards consisted of 
generally accepted auditing standards that were in existence on April 16, 2003, including the 
guidance set forth in AU Section 312 (PCAOB 2003).  In 2010, the PCAOB issued Auditing 
Standard (AS) No. 8, Audit Risk, effective for public company audits beginning on or after 
December 15, 2010, which superseded the guidance in AU Section 312.7  Although AS No. 8 
uses slightly different terminology, the concept of assessing risk at lower levels of the audit 
                                                            
6 The AU codification organizes the SAS according to topical content. 
7 For nonpublic entities not subject to the PCAOB, SAS No. 47 was superseded by SAS No. 107, 
Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit, which was effective for audits beginning on 
or after December 15, 2006 (AICPA 2006).    
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remains intact.8   However, for the period examined in this study, AU Section 312 is the 
authoritative auditing guidance relating to the use of the audit risk model.   
B. PRIOR LITERATURE 
Prior research examining the use of the audit risk model at the account level finds little 
evidence that auditors employ the model in practice.  These studies, however, examine specific 
settings (e.g., particular accounts or time periods) with small samples and focus on adjustments 
to substantive audit procedures in the presence of risk factors.  Jiambalvo and Waller (1984) 
examine experimentally whether auditors alter audit procedures in the presence of specific client 
risks surrounding an important account balance, accounts receivable.  They do not find a 
significant difference in the design of substantive audit tests between auditors that are required to 
first consider inherent and control risk and auditors that are not.  Daniel (1988) extends the work 
by Jiambalvo and Waller (1984) related to auditors’ risk assessments of accounts receivable 
using a slightly larger sample of auditors and finds that auditors do not follow a well-defined 
model to assess audit risk.  Bedard (1989) examines data from actual audit engagements in the 
accounts receivable, inventory, and accounts payable areas.  She finds little evidence of 
adjustments to audit plans based on the presence of risk factors.  Using data gathered on risk 
assessments from the working papers of 74 randomly selected manufacturing clients of one Big 
N auditing firm, Mock and Wright (1999) find that while risk assessments and evidential plans 
                                                            
8 Auditing Standard No. 8, Audit Risk, which superseded SAS No. 47, includes updated 
terminology to read “at the assertion level” rather than at the account balance or class of 
transactions level.  It is clear however, that the “assertion level” refers to the assertions at the 
account balance or class of transactions level.  For example, PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 12, 
Identifying and Assessing Risks of Material Misstatement, describes the approach auditors are to 
take to identify and assess risks of material misstatement at the financial statement level and then 
work down to the significant accounts and disclosures and their relevant assertions (PCAOB 
2010b).   
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for accounts receivable differ considerably across engagements, audit plans for accounts 
receivable are not strongly associated with the level of client risks.  
While many studies fail to find that account-level audit plans are adjusted for specific 
risks, there are some exceptions.  Mock and Wright (1993) gather audit testing and risk 
assessments related to accounts receivable and accounts payable over a two year period from a 
sample of manufacturing and merchandising clients.  Their findings do not indicate a strong 
association between the nature of tests and the level of risks; however, they find that the extent 
(amount) of substantive tests is related to some risk factors.  Using 215 actual audit engagements 
from one Big N auditor, Waller (1993) examines auditors’ inherent and control risk assessments 
for assertions related to three specific accounts: accounts receivable, inventory, and accounts 
payable.  He finds that auditors typically assess inherent risk and control risk at the same value 
for all assertions for an account.  He finds that in many cases control risk is assessed at the 
maximum and suggests that this relates to audit efficiency.9  He also finds a positive but weak 
association between inherent risk and auditor detected misstatements suggesting that auditors’ 
substantive procedures are guided by the identification of risk.   
Although prior research examining account-level risk assessments finds little evidence 
that auditors adjust substantive audit procedures for specific risks (inherent and control risk), 
these studies focus on certain routine accounts only (such as accounts receivable, inventory, or 
accounts payable) and are limited to small sample sizes with data typically from one audit firm.  
In recent years, increased disclosure requirements related to audit fees and internal control 
                                                            
9 Prior to the passage of SOX for public company audits, auditing standards specifically allowed 
auditors of public companies to use a non-reliance strategy, where auditors could forego testing 
controls, assess control risk at the maximum, and alter the nature, timing and extent of 
substantive procedures accordingly (AICPA 1988).    
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weaknesses has allowed for examination of audit risk and its components at the overall financial 
statements level using larger samples.  For example, Hogan and Wilkins (2008) examine whether 
the audit risk model is descriptive of what occurs in practice by examining audit fees in the fiscal 
year prior to disclosure of internal control deficiencies for a sample of firms that disclosed 
deficiencies between November 2003 and November 2004.  To the extent that audit fees 
represent auditor effort, their results suggest that auditors increase their effort in the presence of 
increased control risk.  Other studies also find that companies disclosing material weaknesses in 
internal control have higher audit fees (see e.g., Raghunandan and Rama 2006; Hoitash et al. 
2008; Hoag and Hollingsworth 2011).  Hoitash et al. (2008) and Hoag and Hollingsworth (2011) 
find that audit pricing for companies with internal control problems varies by the severity and 
nature of the problem (when severity is measured as material weaknesses versus significant 
deficiency and nature is measured as entity-level versus account-specific control weaknesses).  
They find a stronger association between audit fees and entity-level control weaknesses.  Unlike 
many of the earlier studies using actual audit engagement working papers, the findings of these 
studies suggest that auditors do respond to increased levels of risk related to internal controls 
(although the alternative explanation of auditors simply charging a risk premium cannot be ruled 
out).   
While the findings from these studies suggest an increase in auditor effort in the presence 
of higher control risk, another stream of research finds that companies with internal control 
weaknesses have lower accrual quality.  This would suggest that, on average, although auditors 
increase their effort in the presence of high control risk, the additional effort is not necessarily 
effective.  Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) find that companies reporting internal control 
deficiencies (302 and 404 for accelerated filers) have lower accrual quality relative to companies 
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without internal control problems.  Doyle et al. (2007) find a consistent result but that this 
relation is driven by weakness disclosures that relate to overall entity-level controls, which may 
be more difficult to audit around.  They do not find a significant association between accrual 
quality and account-specific weaknesses.  Li and Wang (2006) find that companies that report 
material weaknesses are more likely to report restatements in the future, although they do not 
perform their examination at the account level and their examination focuses solely on material 
weaknesses disclosed via Section 404 of SOX.  Lu et al. (2011) find a direct negative association 
between disclosed internal control weaknesses and accrual quality.  However, they find an 
offsetting indirect effect between internal control weaknesses on accrual quality when audit fees 
are higher.  They suggest that although accrual quality in the presence of internal control 
weaknesses improves as audit fees increase, accrual quality is still lower relative to companies 
without internal control weakness.   
C. HYPOTHESES 
While the results of earlier research using data from actual audit engagements provide 
little evidence to suggest that audit plans are modified for risk assessments for specific accounts, 
more recent research using audit fees to proxy for auditor effort suggests that auditor effort is 
sensitive to auditors’ risk assessments.  Prior research also suggests, however, that additional 
auditor effort may not necessarily be effective, at least at the overall financial statements level, in 
maintaining audit risk at a constant level given the observed association between internal control 
weaknesses and accrual quality.  Given the lack of a clear linkage between the pricing of 
additional risk by auditors and the effectiveness of the audit procedures potentially represented 
by the additional fees, and that overall accrual quality may not necessarily indicate whether a 
material misstatement exists, prior research provides little evidence of whether auditor effort, as 
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represented by fees, is effective in restricting audit risk to an acceptably low level at the account 
level in response to an assessment of high control risk.      
I extend prior research by examining the effectiveness of the audit risk model at the 
account level using a large sample of companies that take a reliance approach for testing and 
evaluating internal controls.  If the audit risk model is indicative of what occurs in practice and 
the alteration of the nature, timing and extent of substantive audit procedures is effective in 
restricting audit risk to a consistent, low level, then the likelihood of material misstatement 
within a specific account would not differ between companies with account-specific internal 
control weaknesses and those without, after controlling for other factors that could affect the 
likelihood of misstatement within the account.  Although prior research finds that overall accrual 
quality is lower, on average, for companies with internal control weaknesses, Doyle et al. (2007) 
find that this association is significant only in the presence of entity-level internal control 
weaknesses and not account-specific internal control weaknesses.  This finding suggests that 
auditors’ alteration of account-specific substantive procedures in response to high control risk 
may be effective in restricting the risk of material misstatement within the specific account.  As 
such, my first hypothesis is the following (stated in the null): 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of an account level misstatement (capturing the 
effectiveness of the account-level audit procedures in maintaining a consistent, low level 
of audit risk) does not differ with an assessment of high account-level control risk.   
 
At the overall financial statements level, the findings in Lu et al. (2011) suggest that 
increased auditor effort does improve overall accrual quality in the presence of internal control 
weaknesses, although this substitution effect is limited and incomplete.  I extend this research by 
directly linking internal control weaknesses and misstatements at the account level and 
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examining the effect of increased auditor effort related to the internal control weakness.  My 
second hypothesis, therefore, is the following: 
Hypothesis 2: As auditor effort (measured using excess audit fees) increases, the 
likelihood of an account-level misstatement (capturing the effectiveness of the account-
level audit procedures in maintaining a consistent, low level of audit risk) does not differ 
with an assessment of high account-level control risk.    
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III. RESEARCH METHOD 
To test my first hypothesis, I use accounting restatements to capture materially misstated 
accounts within misstated periods.  I identify internal control weaknesses within the same 
account grouping.  I examine whether the probability of an account-level misstatement differs 
between companies with an assessment of high account-level control risk and those without.  
Thus, detection risk (the auditor response to the assessed level of risk) is a function of the 
assessment of control risk, and audit failure at the account level (capturing audit risk) is the 
observed outcome (i.e., the misstatement identified through subsequent restatement).  To 
determine whether auditors effectively maintain a consistent, low level of audit risk at the 
account level in the presence of high control risk, I estimate the following logistic regression 
model separately for each account grouping examined: 
Pr(Misstate_acctspecificit=1) = β0 + β1HighCR_acctspecificit + β2LnAssetsit + β3LEVit + 
β4MTBit + β5FINit + β6Lossit + β7StdROAit + β8LnSEGit + β9FOROPSit + 
β10M&Ait + β11Restructureit + β12BigNit + β13Specialistit + β14EntityICweakit + 
β15HighCR_otheracctsit + βkIndustry FE + βkYear FE    (1) 
 
where:  
 
Misstate_acctspecific = an indicator set equal to one if the specific account grouping (as outlined 
in Appendix B) was misstated in year t, and zero otherwise; 
 
HighCR_acctspecific = an indicator set equal to one if control risk is high within a specific 
account grouping (as outlined in Appendix B), where high control risk is 
measured as the disclosure of a 404 material weakness and/or a 302 
material weakness within the specific account grouping during year t, and 
zero otherwise; 
 
LnAssets  = the natural log of total assets; 
 
LEV = long-term debt plus the current portion of long-term debt divided by 
total assets; 
 
MTB = the market-to-book ratio, calculated as the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity;   
 
FIN   = debt and equity issuances during year t divided by total assets; 
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Loss = an indicator variable set equal to one if net income is less than zero, and 
zero otherwise; 
 
StdROA = the standard deviation of return on assets over the prior five years, where 
return on assets is net income divided by total assets; 
 
LnSEG  = the natural log of the number operating segments; 
 
FOROPS = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company has foreign 
operations, and zero otherwise; 
 
M&A = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company is involved in a 
merger or acquisition during the year, and zero otherwise; 
 
Restructure = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company is involved in 
restructuring activity during the year, and zero otherwise; 
 
BigN = an indicator variable set equal to one if the auditor is from the Big 4, and 
zero otherwise; 
 
Specialist = an indicator variable set equal to one if the auditor is an industry 
specialist (audit fee market share in the 2-digit SIC code exceeds 30% at 
the national level), and zero otherwise; 
 
EntityICweak = an indicator if variable set equal to one if there is a control environment 
weakness (e.g., senior management competency, tone, reliability issues, 
accounting documentation, policy and/or procedures, accounting 
personnel resources, competency or training, information technology, 
software, security and access issues, segregation of duties/design of 
controls, or journal entry control issues); 
 
HighCR_otheraccts = an indicator variable set equal to one if control risk is high within 
account groupings other than the account being examined (as outlined in 
Appendix B), where high control risk is measured as the disclosure of a 
404 material weakness and/or a 302 material weakness within the specific 
account grouping during year t, and zero otherwise; 
 
Industry FE = indicator variables for each industry following Ashbaugh et al. (2003) 
determined by SIC code as follows: agriculture (0100-0999), mining and 
construction (1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399), food (2000-2111), 
textiles and printing/publishing (2200-2799), chemicals (2800-2824; 
2840-2899), pharmaceuticals (2830-2836), extractive (1300-1399; 2900-
2999), durable manufacturers (3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579 and 
3670-3679), transportation (4000-4899), retail (5000-5999), services 
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(7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379), computers (3570-3579; 3670-3679; 
7370-7379), and utilities (4900-4999);  
 
Year FE   = indicator variables for each year in the sample period; and  
i and t    = company and year indicators, respectively.   
 
For each regression, the coefficient of interest is β1, which is the coefficient on the 
variable HighCR_acctspecific, indicating whether or not account-specific internal control 
weaknesses affect the likelihood of misstatement in that particular account grouping and 
providing insights into the effectiveness of auditors’ response to an assessment of high control 
risk to maintain a consistent level of audit risk.  Because the risk of material misstatement at the 
account level consists of both inherent risk and control risk, I control for inherent risk, high 
control risk within other accounts, and control risk at the entity-level.     
Inherent risk refers to the susceptibility of an account or related assertion to misstatement 
before consideration of any related controls (AICPA 1983). SAS No. 47 states that inherent risk 
at the account level can arise from the nature of the account (more subjectivity, volume of 
transactions, susceptibility to theft, etc.) as well as from external factors that could affect several 
or all of the account balances (e.g., technological developments, market or industry dynamics, 
lack of sufficient capital to operate the business, etc.).10  Cushing and Loebbecke (1983) identify 
several internal and external factors which could influence the likelihood of a material 
misstatement before consideration of internal controls.  These include characteristics of the 
company’s industry, size, market position, financial circumstances, and organizational structure. 
As such, I include company-specific controls for size (LnAssets), leverage (LEV), anticipated 
                                                            
10 Paragraph 22 of SAS No. 47 states, “when the auditor assesses inherent risk for an account 
balance or class of transactions, he…considers not only factors peculiar to the related balance or 
class, but also other factors pervasive to the financial statements taken as a whole that may also 
influence inherent risk related to the balance or class” (AICPA 1983). 
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growth (MTB), and financing needs (FIN) (see also Romanus et al. 2008 and Blankley et al. 
2012).  I control for inherent risk that arises from financial distress (Loss) and uncertainty in 
company performance (StdROA) (following Hogan and Wilkins 2008).  I control for company 
complexity using the natural log of the number of operating segments (LnSEG) and the existence 
of foreign operations (FOROP).  I control for the inherent risk that arises from nonrecurring 
transactions such as mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and restructurings (Restructure).  I include 
industry fixed effects to control for inherent risk that can arise from industry dynamics (i.e., 
changes in product demand, changes in industry sales, etc.).   
In addition to controls for inherent risk, I control for high control risk within other 
accounts (HighCR_otheraccts), and high entity-level control risk (EntityICweak).  To control for 
entity-level control risk, I use a categorization of entity-level control weaknesses consistent with 
Ge and McVay (2005) and Hoitash et al. (2008).  I also include controls for differences in 
auditor characteristics (BigN and Specialist) where specialized methodology or knowledge may 
have an effect on the assessment of inherent and/or control risk related to specific accounts.  
Finally, I include year fixed effects to control for variation in misstatements across time, and I 
cluster standard errors by company to control for serial dependence (Petersen 2009).     
To test my second hypothesis relating to whether the effectiveness of auditors’ response 
to high control risk to maintain a consistent level of audit risk at the account level varies with 
auditor effort, I first estimate additional auditor effort related to the account-specific internal 
control weakness.  Prior research suggests that audit fees capture auditor effort (e.g., see 
Palmrose 1986; O’Keefe et al. 1994; Deis and Giroux 1996; Lu et al. 2011; Blankley et al. 2012; 
Hribar et al. 2014).  From a sample of audits of Texas independent school districts, Deis and 
Giroux (1996) find a significant positive Spearman correlation of 0.76 between audit hours and 
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audit fees.  Several studies find a positive association between audit fees and internal control 
weaknesses, suggesting that auditors increase their effort in the presence of internal control 
weaknesses (e.g., see Raghunandan and Rama 2006; Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Hoitash et al. 
2008; Hoag and Hollingsworth 2011).  Blankley et al. (2012) find that following SOX, abnormal 
audit fees are negatively associated with the likelihood of a future restatement, consistent with 
the notion that lower abnormal fees reflect low audit effort or underestimated audit risk.  
Consistent with this finding, Hribar et al. (2014) find that abnormal audit fees are positively 
correlated with other measures of audit quality and are incrementally predictive of fraud, 
restatements, and SEC comment letters after controlling for other measures of quality.   
To capture auditor effort related to internal control weaknesses, I first identify companies 
that do not disclose any material weaknesses (identified through 404 disclosures in the annual 
filing) or 302 material weaknesses during the related year (identified through 302 disclosures in 
quarterly filings as well as the annual filing).  I then estimate the following audit fee regression 
separately for each year for all companies with no disclosed internal control problems: 
LnAFEEi = δ0 + δ1LnAssetsi + δ2LnSEGi + δ3FOROPSi + δ4ROAi + δ5Lossi +  
δ6INVRECi + δ7LEVi + δ8Delayi + δ9Busyi + δ10GCi + δ11BigNi + δ12RESTATEi 
+ δ13ACCELi + δ14MTBi + δ14Specialisti + δ14Restructurei + δ14M&Ai + 
δ14StdROAi + δkIndustry FE + ɛi       (2) 
 
where:  
 
LnAFEE  = the natural log of audit fees;  
 
ROA   = return on assets measured as net income divided by total assets; 
 
INVREC  = the sum of inventory and accounts receivable divided by total assets; 
 
Delay = the number of consecutive days from the company’s fiscal year-end to 
the date the company’s annual report is filed; 
 
Busy = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s fiscal year ends in 
December or January, and zero otherwise; 
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GC = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company received a going 
concern modification to the auditor’s report, and zero otherwise; 
 
RESTATE = an indicator variable set equal to one if a restatement was announced 
during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise; 
 
ACCEL = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company is categorized as an 
accelerated or large accelerated filer, and zero otherwise; and 
 
all other variables as previously defined.  Model variables follow prior literature (see Hay et al. 
2006; Doogar et al. 2010; Blankley et al. 2012).  Similar to the procedure used by Doogar et al. 
(2010), I save the estimated coefficients for each year’s regression and use them to estimate a 
benchmark audit fee for each company-year in my sample.  The difference between the actual 
audit fee and the benchmark fee represents the fee adjustment related to the internal control 
weakness.  For companies that disclose more than one internal control weakness, I divide this fee 
adjustment by the number of weaknesses disclosed.11  I then use this measure to proxy for 
auditor effort related to account-specific internal control weaknesses.  
Next, I estimate the following logistic regression separately for each account grouping to 
test whether the effectiveness of auditors’ response to high control risk at the account level varies 
with auditor effort:  
Pr(Misstate_acctspecificit=1) = γ0 + γ1HighCR_acctspecificit + γ2AuditFeeAdjit +  
 γ3HighCR_acctspecificit*AuditFeeAdjit + γ4LnAssetsit + γ5LEVit + 
γ6MTBit + γ7FINit + γ8Lossit + γ9StdROAit + γ10LnSEGit + γ11FOROPSit + 
γ12M&Ait + γ13Restructureit + γ14BigNit + γ15Specialistit + γ16EntityICweakit + 
γ17HighCR_otheracctsit + γkIndustry FE + γkYear FE    (3) 
 
where:  
 
AuditFeeAdj = auditor effort related to the internal control weakness, estimated by 
subtracting the estimated benchmark log of audit fees from actual log of 
audit fees and dividing this measure by the number of internal control 
                                                            
11 In supplemental analysis, I exclude observations with more than one account level internal 
control weakness.   
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material weaknesses present, where the benchmark log of audit fees is 
estimated by saving the parameter estimates from equation (2); and  
 
all other variables as previously defined.  For each regression, the coefficient of interest is γ3, 
which is the coefficient on the interaction of HighCR_acctspecific and AuditFeeAdj.  The sign 
and significance of this coefficient indicates whether or not additional auditor effort has a 
moderating effect on the likelihood of misstatement within an account with high control risk.   
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IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
A. SAMPLE SELECTION 
The sample is comprised of accelerated filers subject to the provisions of Section 404 of 
SOX from 2004 through 2009 with available data in Compustat and Audit Analytics to construct 
the model variables.  Appendix A presents all variable definitions.  Because accelerated filers are 
subject to the provisions of SOX, they are required to have an audit of internal controls over 
financial reporting.  I include these firms in my sample to ensure that controls are tested by the 
auditor.  Prior to 2004, auditors of accelerated filers were not required to test internal controls.  
Depending on the nature of the account as well as other factors influencing audit efficiency and 
effectiveness, auditors could use a non-reliance strategy by deciding not to test controls for a 
particular account or class of transactions, thereby assessing control risk as high and adjusting 
the nature, timing and extent of substantive audit procedures accordingly.  Likewise, auditors of 
non-accelerated filers can use this strategy because these companies are not subject to an audit of 
internal control over financial reporting.  The sample period ends in 2009 to allow time for 
misstatements to be revealed through a subsequent restatement.  I use the categorization of 
restatements in Audit Analytics to identify misstatements within specific accounts.12  Likewise, I 
use the categorization of internal control weaknesses in Audit Analytics, which is consistent with 
the categorization of restatements, to determine account-specific internal control weaknesses.13 
                                                            
12 Audit Analytics provides the restatement announcement date as well as the beginning and 
ending dates of the misstated period.  Using these dates, I identify misstated periods.    
13 Because I am interested in the auditor’s adjustment to detection risk based on the assessment 
of control risk, I do not categorize company-years with restated adverse internal control opinions 
as high control risk.  To ensure that I capture only non-restated opinions of internal control over 
financial reporting, I use the Audit Analytics variable IS NTH RESTATE to identify restated 
internal control opinions (i.e., observations where the high control risk was not identified until 
after the related audit through a subsequent restatement) and ensure that high control risk is set at 
‘0’ for these observations.   
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Appendix B presents the categorization by Audit Analytics for specific account 
groupings.14  To examine the reliability of the Audit Analytics categorization by account 
grouping, I randomly selected thirty observations with an identified material weakness in internal 
control over financial reporting and compared these with actual company filings.  I find that 
disclosures within company filings are 1) specific enough to determine the account or account 
grouping affected, and 2) consistent with the categorization by Audit Analytics.15  Appendix C 
presents examples of company provided disclosures of internal control material weaknesses.    
Because 404 internal control opinions report the state of internal controls ‘as of’ the 
period end date, there may be observations where internal control weaknesses exist during the 
year but are remediated before year-end.  Although the internal control weakness does not exist 
at the balance sheet date, if it is present during the audit period, auditors would not be able to 
rely on the effectiveness of the controls for purposes of the financial statement audit and would 
have to adjust the nature, timing and extent of their audit procedures accordingly.  As such, in 
order to better capture high control risk within these account groupings, I not only identify 404 
material weakness disclosures within specific account groupings, but also 302 disclosures of 
                                                            
14 I use the categorizations in Audit Analytics to identify account-level misstatements and 
internal control material weaknesses.  Audit Analytics includes other categorizations that are not 
included in my analyses due to either a small number of observations or a lack of identification 
to a specific account or account grouping.  The categories that I do not use are: asset retirement 
obligations; gain or loss recognition issues; classification issues related to the balance sheet, 
statement of cash flows or income statement; consolidation and financial close issues such as 
intercompany/ subsidiary/ affiliate issues; off-balance sheet consolidation issues; and financial 
statement footnote or segment disclosure issues. 
15 Of the thirty observations selected, I noted only one issue.  For one observation, I noted that 
the original internal control disclosure did not indicate a material weakness.  Through review of 
the related SEC filings, I noted that the material weakness in internal control was a restatement 
of the original disclosure.  As such, I performed the procedures outlined in footnote 13 to ensure 
that only original internal control disclosures are considered.   
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material weaknesses for these groupings that occurred during the fiscal year (i.e., those in interim 
quarterly filings). 
[Insert Table 1 Here]    
Table 1 presents a summary of the sample selection procedure as well as a breakout of 
misstatements and internal control weaknesses by account grouping. The final sample consists of 
22,253 company-year observations with available data from Compustat and Audit Analytics, 
which includes 1,346 misstated company-years and 2,606 company-years with an account-
specific internal control weakness at some point during the year. To perform my tests at the 
account-grouping level, I exclude company-year observations that do not have a balance for the 
particular account grouping.  Compustat variables used to identify missing or zero balances are 
listed in Table 1.   
Table 1 also reveals that the percentage of company-years with an account-specific 
internal control weakness that result in a future restatement of that particular account ranges from 
1.5 to 10.3 percent, while the percentage of company-years without an account-specific internal 
control weakness that result in a future restatement of that particular account ranges from 0.2 to 
6.4 percent.  If auditors alter detection risk to maintain a consistent, low level of audit risk, then 
these two ratios should be the same.  Although the percentage of account-level misstatements 
with an assessed internal control weakness is larger than the percentage of account-level 
misstatements without an assessed internal control weakness (with the exception of acquisition, 
merger, disposal or reorganization issues), only a few account groupings exceed 5 percent (lease 
related issues; deferred, stock-based and/or executive compensation issues; derivatives/hedging 
issues; and tax expense/benefit/deferral/other issues).  However, of the total company-year 
observations with a high level of assessed control risk within a particular account (2,606), 240 or 
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9.2 percent experience a future restatement of that account, compared to 5.6 percent of the 
company-year observations without high account-level control risk.    
B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics.  Rather than including all account-specific internal 
control weaknesses and misstatements, I include Misstate, an indicator variable set equal to one 
if an account-specific misstatement exists, and ICWeak_Acct, an indicator variable set equal to 
one if an account-specific internal control weakness exists.  The descriptive statistics indicate 
that approximately 6 percent of the company-years in the sample are misstated, while 12.3 
percent have an account-specific internal control weakness and 8.4 percent have an entity-level 
control weakness.   
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Table 3 presents the Spearman and Pearson correlations.  I find positive and significant 
correlations (at p ≤ 0.01) between Misstate and ICWeak_Acct.  I also find positive and 
significant correlations (at p ≤ 0.01) between ICWeak_Acct and AuditFeeAdj.  I also examine 
correlations between AuditFeeAdj and high control risk within specific account groupings for 
each of the separate account-level subsamples.   
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Table 4 presents the Spearman and Pearson correlations between AuditFeeAdj and high 
control risk within each account grouping.  I find positive and significant correlations between 
AuditFeeAdj and high control risk within each account grouping.  Although these positive 
associations suggest that auditors expend additional effort in the presence of high control risk, 
regardless of the account, there may be some differences in the amount of effort expended by 
auditors for certain accounts (correlations range from 0.022 to 0.178).    
 28 
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
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V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
Table 5 presents the results of the regression models used to test my first hypothesis.  For 
each of the regressions presented, the area under the ROC curve ranges from 0.761 to 0.897 
suggesting fair model fit (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000).  For each of the account groupings, 
with the exception of pensions and other post-employment benefits and acquisition, merger, 
disposal or reorganization issues, after controlling for inherent risk factors, high control risk 
within other accounts, entity-level control risk, and differences in auditor characteristics, I find 
that when account-level control risk is high there is an increased likelihood of a material 
misstatement within that account, suggesting an insufficient adjustment to detection risk to 
maintain a consistent level of audit risk.  For these account groupings, the odds of a material 
misstatement within an account with high control risk is approximately 1.7 to 7.3 over the odds 
of a material misstatement within an account without high control risk.  For acquisition, merger, 
disposal or reorganization issues, I find a decreased incidence of account-level misstatements 
when related control risk is high, suggesting that auditors’ substantive procedures for these non-
routine, higher profile transactions not only compensate for the additional risk but result in a 
lower level of audit risk.   
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Next, I examine the effectiveness in maintaining a consistent level of account-level audit 
risk as auditor effort increases in response to high account-level control risk.  Table 6 presents 
the results of the audit fee regressions, estimated by year for companies without internal control 
weaknesses, used to measure auditor effort related to internal control weaknesses.  In general, I 
find that the sign and significance of model variables are consistent with prior research.  I find 
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that the significance of some model variables varies by year (e.g., LEV, Busy, RESTATE, 
M&A, and StdROA).  The adjusted r-square for the regressions range from 0.815 to 0.827 
indicating good model fit.  The parameters from these regressions are then applied to the sample 
observations to determine a benchmark audit fee assuming no internal control weaknesses, which 
is subtracted from the actual audit fee to capture auditor effort related to internal control 
weaknesses.   
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
Table 7 presents the results of the regression models used to test my second hypothesis.  
Consistent with Table 5, I find an increased likelihood of misstatement in an account with high 
control risk, with the exception of pensions and other post-retirement benefits and acquisition, 
merger, disposal or reorganization issues.  I find a negative and significant coefficient on the 
interaction of AuditFeeAdj and HighCR_acctspecific for revenue related issues; inventory and 
cost of sales issues; expense related issues; liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual estimate 
failures; tax related issues; intangible or fixed asset value/diminution issues; and acquisition, 
merger, disposal or reorganization issues.  To the extent that AuditFeeAdj captures auditor effort, 
these results suggest that increased auditor effort in response to an assessment of high control 
risk is effective in maintaining a consistent level of audit risk at the account-level.  Many of these 
accounts appear routine or core to the on-going operations of the business.  Because the volume 
and frequency of transactions related to these routine or core accounts are high, auditors can 
increase sample sizes of substantive audit tests to respond to the increased risk.  In relation to 
fixed asset or intangible asset valuation issues, which requires more judgment, increased control 
risk might lead to greater use of valuation specialists.  The use of valuation specialists can 
improve the audit of the estimate as well as increase audit fees.  For acquisition, merger, disposal 
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or reorganization issues, which tend to be infrequent, significant events, auditors may divert 
significant attention and resources to ensure appropriate accounting when internal controls in this 
area are weak. 
For other non-routine accounts, including accounts/loans receivable, investments and 
cash issues; lease, legal, contingency and commitment issues; deferred, stock-based and/or 
executive compensation issues; financial derivatives/hedging issues; and debt, quasi-debt, 
warrants and equity security issues; I find an insignificant coefficient on the interaction of 
AuditFeeAdj and HighCR_acctspecific.  This suggests that for these specific account groupings, 
which appear to be related to more frequent or recurring non-routine processes, even high levels 
of auditor effort are not effective in maintaining a consistent level of audit risk at the account 
level.    
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
True Interaction Effect 
Following Norton et al. (2004), I examine the true interaction effect using the INTEFF 
procedure in STATA.   Ai and Norton (2003) and Greene (2010) suggest that the coefficient of 
the interaction term in nonlinear models can vary in sign and statistical significance from the test 
of the estimated coefficient of the interaction term.  To determine if the true interaction effect is 
significant, I examine the mean interaction effect as well as the mean z-score of the interaction.  
Table 8 presents, by account grouping, statistics provided by the INTEFF command.  
Specifically, the table presents the mean, as well as the minimum and maximum interaction 
effect (marginal effect), the mean z-statistic, as well as the minimum and maximum z-statistic, 
and the proportion of z-statistics in the significant range (p<0.10).  I find that for revenue 
recognition issues, inventory and cost of sales issues, expense related issues, liabilities/payables, 
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reserves and accrual estimate failures, value/diminution issues related to intangibles or fixed 
assets, and acquisition, merger, disposal, or reorganization issues that the interaction effect does 
not change sign, the mean z-statistic of the interaction effect is above or near conventional levels 
of significance, and a large proportion of the z-statistics are in the significant range.  Thus, I find 
evidence that the true interaction effect for each of the account groupings with a significant 
interaction coefficient from Table 7 appears significant with the exception of tax related issues 
(i.e., the interaction effect does not change sign, the mean z-statistic is statistically significant 
and/or a fairly significant portion of the z-statistics are in the significant range).  For tax related 
issues, there is little evidence to suggest that the true interaction effect is significant.     
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Marginal Effect of High Control Risk at Varying Levels of Audit Effort 
I further explore the effectiveness of additional auditor effort by examining the 
association between internal control weaknesses within specific accounts and misstatements 
within those same accounts at various levels of auditor effort.  Wiersema and Bowen (2008) 
recommend this tabular presentation if the true interaction effect is statistically significant.  Table 
9 presents the marginal effect of HighCR_acctspecific at various levels of AuditFeeAdj, while 
holding fixed the value of all other model variables at their sample mean.  The accounts included 
in this table are those where the interaction term between HighCR_acctspecific and AuditFeeAdj 
is significant based on the results from Table 7 and the procedures previously discussed to test 
the true interaction effect.  I split AuditFeeAdj into five levels, where very low (very high) 
AuditFeeAdj is two standard deviations below (above) the sample mean, and low (high) 
AuditFeeAdj is one standard deviation below (above) the sample mean.   For each of the account 
groupings, I find that when AuditFeeAdj is at or below the sample mean, the marginal effect of 
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account-specific internal control weaknesses on the likelihood of misstatements within those 
specific accounts is positive and significant, suggesting that high levels of auditor effort in 
response to an assessment of high control risk is effective in maintaining a consistent level of 
audit risk at the account level.  For acquisition, merger, disposal or reorganization issues, where 
the likelihood of an ineffective response to high control risk is low on average relative to 
company-years where control risk is not high, I find that this only occurs at higher levels of 
AuditFeeAdj. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
Because I am interested in the effort associated specifically with auditors’ response to an 
assessment of high account-level control risk, I re-perform this analysis examining the effect of 
different levels of AuditFeeAdj using only the distribution of the 2,606 company-years with high 
control risk.  For this subset of company-year observations, mean AuditFeeAdj is 0.268 with a 
standard deviation of 0.554.  Table 10 presents this analysis.  Using these alternative cut-offs for 
AuditFeeAdj, I find consistent results with those presented in Table 9.  The only differences 
noted are that the marginal effect of HighCR_acctspecific is not significant when AuditFeeAdj is 
at the mean for expense related issues and HighCR_acctspecific is significant when AuditFeeAdj 
is one standard deviation below the mean for acquisition, merger, disposal or reorganization 
issues. 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
Visualizing the Interaction Effect 
To assess the magnitude of these effects, I examine graphical evidence to visualize and 
interpret how the interaction of AuditFeeAdj and HighCR_acctspecific affects the predicted 
probabilities of misstatement within these specific account groupings (see e.g., Evans et al. 2010; 
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Greene 2010).  While the use of predicted probabilities are intuitive for interpreting main effects 
and interactions, the pattern of results depends on the values of all other model variables.  
Mitchell and Chen (2005) discuss a methodology for visualization of the interaction on the 
predicted probability of the outcome, creating an index for the covariate contribution (the 
contribution of all other covariates in the model).  Figures 1a through 1f present graphs for each 
account grouping with a significant interaction effect.  These figures present graphs of the 
predicted probability of misstatement within an account as excess audit fees increase for 
companies with high control risk within the specific account, and those without, holding 
covariate contribution at its median value.  The vertical reference lines in each figure are set at 
two standard deviations below (above) mean AuditFeeAdj.  I find when control risk related to 
revenue is high, the predicted probability of a revenue related misstatement is approximately 7.5 
percent when AuditFeeAdj is two standard deviations below the sample mean.  Increasing 
AuditFeeAdj from two standard deviations below the mean to two standard deviations above the 
mean, holding covariate contribution at the median, decreases the estimated probability of a 
revenue related misstatement by approximately 6.5 percent.  Under the same scenario for 
inventory and cost of sales, there is a 2 percent decline in the estimated probability of 
misstatement from 2.5 percent to 0.5 percent.  For expense related issues, the decline is 4 
percent, from 4.5 percent to 0.5 percent.  For liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual estimate 
failures, the decline is 3.5 percent, from 4.5 percent to 1.0 percent.  For intangible or fixed asset 
value/diminution issues, the decline is 5 percent, from 6.0 percent to 1.0 percent.   
[Insert Figures 1a – 1f Here] 
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VI. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
A. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES OF AUDIT EFFORT CONSTRUCT 
In this Section I examine the robustness of AuditFeeAdj, my construct for audit effort 
related to account-level internal control weaknesses.  To determine whether the results in my 
primary analyses are sensitive to research design choices, I first examine whether my measure of 
excess audit fees captures effort related to internal control weaknesses by examining the effect of 
internal control material weaknesses on audit fees.  Second, because I make assumptions about 
the level of effort related to internal control weaknesses when more than one account-level 
internal control weakness is present, I examine a subset of observations with only one account-
level internal control weakness.  Third, because I make the assumption that the entire excess fee 
adjustment represents additional audit effort related to internal control weaknesses and lower 
levels of audit fee adjustment could represent less effort in other areas of the audit rather than the 
account(s) with high control risk, I re-perform my tests censoring low levels of AuditFeeAdj or 
deleting those observations from my tests.    
The Effect of Internal Control Weaknesses on Audit Fees 
To provide further evidence that my measure of excess audit fees is capturing effort 
related to internal control weaknesses, I examine the effect of internal control material 
weaknesses on audit fees.  Table 11 presents the results of four separate regressions where the 
dependent variable is the natural log of audit fees.  The first column presents the results without a 
variable capturing the effect of internal control weaknesses.  The second column presents the 
results of the effect of internal control material weaknesses.  In this column, I include the 
variable ICMW, an indicator variables set equal to one if a material weakness in internal control 
is present, and zero otherwise.  The third column includes a variable to capture the magnitude of 
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the internal control problem.   COUNT_ICMW represents the number of material weaknesses in 
internal control present.  The fourth column includes both ICMW and COUNT_ICMW.  
Consistent with prior research, I find a positive and significant association between internal 
control weaknesses and audit fees with an incremental increase in the explanatory power of the 
model.  I also find when including a variable for the count of internal control weaknesses, while 
controlling for the presence of an internal control weakness, that both the presence and severity 
of internal control problems are positively associated with audit fees and increase the 
explanatory power of the model. 
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
Capturing Audit Effort at the Account Level When Excess Audit Fees Are Low 
My measure of auditor effort in the presence of account-level internal control weaknesses 
assumes that equal auditor effort is given to internal control weaknesses when more than one 
account-level internal control weakness exists. Because this may not always hold true, I re-
perform my tests by excluding observations from the sample with more than one account-level 
internal control weakness disclosed.  Table 12 presents the results of these limited samples.  
Table 12 does not include the results when the dependent variable is an expense related 
misstatement, a lease related misstatement, or a pension/OPEB related misstatement because 
high control risk within those particular accounts perfectly predicts the dependent variable (i.e., 
none of the observations with high control risk within the particular account have a misstatement 
within the same account).  With the exception of inventory and cost of sales issues and 
acquisition, merger, disposal or reorganization issues, I find results generally consistent with 
those presented in Table 5, in that the likelihood of misstatement within a particular account is 
higher when control risk within the account is assessed as high.  For inventory and cost of sales 
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issues and acquisition, merger, disposal or reorganization issues, I do not find a significant 
difference in the likelihood of misstatement between companies with high control risk and those 
without.   
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
Table 13 presents the results of my second hypothesis excluding observations from the 
sample with more than one account-level internal control weakness disclosed.  Table 13 does not 
include the results when the dependent variable is an expense related misstatement, a lease 
related misstatement, or a pension/OPEB related misstatement because high control risk within 
those particular accounts perfectly predicts the dependent variable (i.e., none of the observations 
with high control risk within the particular account have a misstatement within the same 
account).  I find results generally consistent with those presented in Table 7.  I do not find a 
significantly higher likelihood of an inventory related misstatement when control risk is high.  I 
also do not find that the likelihood is affected by increasing audit effort.  Unlike Table 7, with 
this limited sample I do find that AuditFeeAdj has a moderating effect on the increased 
likelihood of a stock compensation related misstatement when control risk is high.  For 
investments and cash issues and financial derivatives/hedging issues, I find that the likelihood of 
misstatement increases as AuditFeeAdj increases when control risk is high within these accounts.  
Overall, other than the differences noted, the results are fairly consistent with the main tests.   
[Insert Table 13 Here] 
Additionally, in my main tests, the full audit fee adjustment is attributed to the account(s) 
with the internal control weakness.  However, a lower fee adjustment may not necessarily 
represent lower effort related to that account but to other areas of the audit (i.e., the auditor 
diverts attention from less risky areas of the audit to areas of higher risk).  Therefore, I re-
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perform my tests in the following ways.  First, I censor AuditFeeAdj at zero for companies that 
have internal control weaknesses.  Second, I exclude observations with high control risk within 
specific accounts where AuditFeeAdj is negative.  Table 14 presents the results of my second 
hypothesis where AuditFeeAdj is censored at zero for companies that have internal control 
weaknesses.  I find consistent results with those presented in Table 7.     
[Insert Table 14 Here] 
Tables 15 and 16 present the results of my primary tests excluding observations with high 
control risk within specific accounts where AuditFeeAdj is negative.  Table 15 presents the 
results of my first hypothesis with these limited samples.  Results are generally consistent with 
those presented in Table 5.  The only differences noted are that high control risk related to 
expense issues or intangible or fixed asset value/diminution issues is not significantly associated 
with the likelihood of misstatement within those accounts.   
[Insert Table 15 Here] 
Table 16 presents the results of my second hypothesis with these limited samples.  Again, 
results are generally consistent with those presented in Table 7.  The only differences noted are 
that the main effect of HighCR_acctspecific is not significantly associated with the likelihood of 
misstatement for expense related issues, investments and cash issues, and debt, quasi-debt, 
warrants and equity security issues. 
[Insert Table 16 Here] 
Overall, the results of these analyses suggest that the results presented in the main tests 
are fairly robust and that for most accounts, on average, auditors do not maintain a consistent 
level of audit risk at the account level in the presence of high control risk.  These analyses also 
suggest that for certain accounts that appear more routine or are related to less frequent non-
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routine processes that additional auditor effort mitigates the likelihood of an ineffective response 
to high control risk.        
B. WHY AUDITORS DO NOT RESPOND EFFECTIVELY  
Given the findings in my primary tests, I explore why auditors do not effectively respond 
to high control risk at the account level.  Several factors could influence the effectiveness of an 
auditor’s response to high control risk at the account level.  For example, a lack of auditor 
expertise or industry knowledge, a lack of client-specific knowledge, a strong incentive to please 
the client to avoid losing future fees, auditor-client misalignments (where a small auditor 
auditing a large company may lack expertise or capacity, or where a large auditor auditing a 
small company may not dedicate sufficient attention or resources), resource constraints on the 
auditor, and time constraints due to filing requirements could all affect the likelihood that an 
auditor’s response to high control risk is not effective in restricting the risk of material 
misstatement to an appropriately low level.  Differences in company characteristics, such as size 
and complexity, as well as the presence of non-recurring transactions could also play a role given 
the time constraints imposed by reporting deadlines.  In addition, weak entity-level controls on 
top of weak account-level controls could exacerbate the risk of material misstatement despite an 
increase in auditor effort.   
To explore why auditors’ alterations of substantive audit procedures are not effective in 
the presence of high control risk, I limit the sample to company-years with high control risk in at 
least one account grouping and use the following logistic regression: 
Pr(Misstate_acctspecificit=1 | HighCR_acctspecificit=1) = α0 + α1LnAssetsit +  
α2OfficeImportit + α3LnSEGit + α4M&Ait + α5Restructureit + α6BigNit + 
α7Specialistit + α8Tenureit + α9OfficeSizeit + α10AUD_WLCit + 
α11Mismatch_LargeAUDit + α12Mismatch_SmallAUDit + α13EntityICweakit + 
α14LateDiscloseit + α15ChgDeadlineit + α16CloseToDeadlineit  (4) 
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where:  
 
OfficeImport = the ratio of total company fees to the sum of total fees of all public 
clients of the auditor office issuing the audit report (see Chung and 
Kallapur 2003);  
 
Tenure = the number of consecutive years to date of the auditor-client 
relationship; 
 
OfficeSize = the natural log of the sum of total fees of all public clients of the auditor 
office issuing the audit report (see Francis and Yu 2009); 
 
AUD_WLC = relative level of workload compression of an auditor office during the 
fiscal year-end month of a client, measured as audit fees charged to clients 
with the same fiscal year-end month in each office divided by the sum of 
total office audit fees during the fiscal year (see Lopez and Peters 2012); 
 
Mismatch_LargeAUD = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company is misaligned with 
a large auditor based on the methodology in Shu (2000), where a large 
auditor is defined as a Big N auditor (PWC, KPMG, Deloitte, and Ernst & 
Young), and zero otherwise; 
 
Mismatch_SmallAUD= an indicator variable set equal to one if the company is misaligned with 
a small auditor based on the methodology in Shu (2000), where a small 
auditor is defined as an auditor other than a Big N auditor, and zero 
otherwise; 
 
LateDisclose = an indicator variable set equal to one if an account-level material 
weakness was disclosed under Section 404 in the annual report, but no 
Section 302 disclosure was made for that particular account in any of the 
interim quarterly filings during the year, and zero otherwise; 
 
ChgDeadline = an indicator set equal to one if the required filing deadline changed 
during the year, and zero otherwise;16 
 
                                                            
16 Historically, the annual report had to be filed with the SEC within 90 days of the company’s 
fiscal year-end.  In 2002, the SEC adopted a final rule to accelerate the filing of quarterly and 
annual reports for accelerated filers. In December 2005, the SEC adopted amendments that 
created a new category of "large accelerated filers" (companies with a public float of $700 
million or more). The amendments also redefine "accelerated filers" as companies that have at 
least $75 million, but less than $700 million, in public float.  For fiscal years beginning after 
December 15, 2006, large accelerated filers  are required to file within 60 days, while the 
deadline for accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers is 75 and 90 days, respectively (SEC 
2002, SEC 2005).   
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CloseToDeadline = an indicator set equal to one if the audit report date is within three days 
of the required filing deadline, and zero otherwise;17,18 and  
 
all other variables as previously defined.   
Table 17 presents the results of this regression.  I find that the likelihood of an ineffective 
response to high control risk is higher for companies with a greater number of operating 
segments (LnSEG), which suggests that client complexity affects an effective auditor response to 
high control risk.  I find an increased likelihood of an ineffective response to high control risk by 
smaller auditors misaligned with larger companies (non-Big N and non-second tier) 
(Mismatch_SmallAUD).  This finding could suggest that smaller auditors may not have 
sufficient expertise or resources for clients that are larger (misaligned).  I find a positive 
association between entity-level control weaknesses and the likelihood of an ineffective response 
to high control risk at the account level.  This result suggests that alterations to account-level 
substantive audit procedures are less likely to be effective in the presence of an entity-level 
control weakness.  I also find that the timing of the disclosure (and presumably the timing of the 
discovery) of the internal control weakness matters.  When internal control weaknesses are 
reported (and presumably discovered) late in the audit process (LateDisclose), there is an 
increased likelihood of an ineffective response.  I also find that when the audit report date is 
close to the required filing date, and the company files on time, auditors are more likely to 
                                                            
17 Alternatively, I define this variable as five days or less between the audit report date and the 
required filing date, 4 days or less, or 2 days or less.  Results are consistent with each of these 
alternative definitions. 
18 To calculate the required filing date, I add the number of days companies have to file based on 
filer status (accelerated, large accelerated, foreign filer, etc.) and the fiscal year.  I adjust required 
filing dates falling on weekends.  I reconcile late filers with Audit Analytics’ non-timely filer 
information and analysis database and adjust required filing dates accordingly. 
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respond effectively to the increased risk.  This suggests that delay in the audit report represents 
effective adjustment to the timing and extent of substantive audit procedures.  
[Insert Table 17 Here] 
Examination by Industry and Year 
 Table 18 presents a breakout, by industry and year, of account level audit failures, 
defined an assessment of high control risk within an account that contains a misstatement.   As 
noted in Panel A, the industries with the largest number of account-level audit failures include 
computers (SIC codes 3570-3579; 3670-3679; 7370-7379), financial companies (SIC codes 
6000-6999), durable manufacturers (SIC codes 3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579 and 3670-
3679), and retailers (SIC codes 5000-5999).  Panel B reveals a decreasing trend in account-level 
audit failures by year.  Although later years in the sample have less elapsed time between the 
misstatement year and the restatement, there does appear to be an improvement over time in 
auditors’ response to assessments of high control risk at the account-level.  
[Insert Table 18 Here] 
Examination by Account 
 In Table 17, I explore why auditors’ alterations of substantive audit procedures are not 
effective in the presence of high control risk.  In additional analyses, I further disaggregate the 
sample in Table 17 to determine whether these explanatory variables vary by account.  Table 19 
presents the results of estimating model (4) separately by account grouping.  Samples are limited 
to observations with high control risk within the specific accounts and the dependent variable 
takes on a value of one if there is a misstatement within the account.  For certain account 
groupings, some variables are dropped in the models because they perfectly predict the 
dependent variable.  The model examining pensions/OPEB cannot run due to too many variables 
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perfectly predicting the dependent variable.  The results reveal some important findings.  First, I 
find that for all accounts examined, with the exception of accounts/loans receivable, investments 
and cash issues, that late discovery of the internal control weakness (LateDisclose)  increases the 
likelihood of an account-level failure.  I find that smaller auditors misaligned with larger 
companies (Mismatch_SmallAUD) increase the likelihood of an account-level audit failure only 
for revenue, accounts/loans receivable, investments and cash issues, and acquisition, merger, 
disposal or reorganization issues.  I find that entity-level control weaknesses (EntityICweak) 
increase the likelihood of an account-level audit failure in revenue, inventory and liabilities, 
payables, reserves and accrual estimate failures.  I find that the increased likelihood of an 
account-level audit failure among companies with more segments (LnSEG) is driven by revenue 
recognition issues.  I find that the decreased likelihood of an account-level audit failure when the 
auditor’s report date is close to the required filing date, and the company files on time 
(CloseToDeadline), is driven by accounts/loans receivable, investments and cash issues, 
financial derivatives/hedging issues, and intangible or fixed asset value/diminution issues.  I find 
that company size (LnAssets) increases the likelihood of an account-level audit failure in 
revenue or liabilities, payables, reserves and accrued liabilities.  Although not significant in 
Table 17, I find that auditor workload compression (AUD_WLC) increases the likelihood of an 
account-level audit failure in expense related issues and intangible or fixed asset 
value/diminution issues.  In summary, the timing of the internal control discovery appears to 
impact all accounts, however, other reasons explaining why auditors respond ineffectively to an 
assessment of high control risk varies somewhat by account. 
[Insert Table 19 Here] 
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VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this study, I examine whether auditors’ response to high control risk (i.e., the 
adjustment to detection risk accomplished by altering the nature, timing, and extent of 
substantive audit procedures) is effective in maintaining a consistent, low level of audit risk at 
the account level.  Additionally, I examine whether the effectiveness of the auditor’s response to 
an assessment of high control risk to maintain a consistent level of audit risk varies as auditor 
effort increases.  The results of this study provide insight into the effectiveness of the audit risk 
model at the account level and help further reconcile findings from prior research.  The results 
indicate that, in many cases, the presence of high control risk within a particular account does not 
result in a future restatement of the account.  However, relative to companies with low control 
risk within the particular account, there is an increased incidence of account-level misstatements 
when control risk within that particular account is high, suggesting that auditors do not maintain 
a consistent level of audit risk at the account level in the presence of high control risk (i.e., 
inadequate auditing of the particular financial statement account with an assessment of high 
control risk).  The results highlight areas of the audit where there is a greater risk of an 
ineffective response to high control risk at the account level, specifically, in accounts related to 
more frequent or recurring non-routine processes. I find that additional auditor effort does 
mitigate the likelihood of an ineffective response to high control risk in a meaningful way for 
account groupings that appear more routine or core to the on-going operations of the business 
(i.e., revenue; inventory and cost of sales; expense related issues; liabilities, payables, reserves 
and accrual estimate failures) or are less frequent non-routine processes (intangible or fixed asset 
value/diminution issues; and acquisition, merger, disposal or reorganization issues).  
In additional analysis, I explore why auditors do not effectively respond to high control 
risk at the account level.  The results suggest that client complexity, auditor-client misalignments 
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for small auditors (presumably due to a lack of expertise or necessary resources), the presence of 
an entity-level internal control weakness, and the timing of internal control weakness reporting 
(and presumably discovery) increase the likelihood of an ineffective response to high control risk 
at the account level.  Further analyses reveal that the timing of internal control weakness 
reporting increases the likelihood of an account-level audit failure for almost all accounts, while 
other reasons, such as client complexity, auditor-client misalignments, entity-level control risk, 
and auditor workload compression, vary by account.       
Overall, the results of this study highlight areas of the audit where auditors can improve 
the link between account-level risk assessments and the design, performance and evaluation of 
substantive audit tests as well as circumstances that may increase the risk of a failure in the audit 
risk model at the account level.   
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Variable Definition 
ACCEL An indicator variable set equal to one if the company is categorized as 
an accelerated or large accelerated filer, and zero otherwise;  
AuditFeeAdj Auditor effort related to the internal control weakness, estimated by 
subtracting the estimated benchmark log of audit fees from actual log 
of audit fees and dividing this measure by the number of internal 
control material weaknesses present, where the benchmark log of 
audit fees is estimated by saving the parameter estimates from 
equation (2) 
AUD_WLC Relative level of workload compression of an auditor office during 
the fiscal year-end month of a client, measured as audit fees charged 
to clients with the same fiscal year-end month in each office divided 
by the sum of total office audit fees during the fiscal year; 
BigN An indicator variable set equal to one if the auditor is from the Big 4, 
and zero otherwise; 
Busy An indicator variable set equal to one if the company’s fiscal year 
ends in December or January, and zero otherwise;  
ChgDeadline An indicator set equal to one if the required filing deadline changed 
during the year, and zero otherwise; 
CloseToDeadline An indicator set equal to one if the audit report date is within three 
days of the required filing deadline, and zero otherwise; 
COUNT_ICMW The number of material weaknesses in internal control present 
Delay The number of consecutive days from the company’s fiscal year-end 
to the date the 10-K is filed;  
EntityICweak An indicator if variable set equal to one if there is a control 
environment weakness (e.g., senior management competency, tone, 
reliability issues, accounting documentation, policy and/or 
procedures, accounting personnel resources, competency or training, 
information  technology, software, security and access issues, 
segregation of duties/design of controls, or journal entry control 
issues); 
FIN Debt and equity issuances during year t divided by total assets; 
FOROPS An indicator variable set equal to one if the company has foreign 
operations, and zero otherwise; 
GC An indicator variable set equal to one if the company received a going 
concern modification to the auditor’s report, and zero otherwise;  
(Continued on next page) 
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HighCR_acctspecific An indicator if control risk is high within a specific account (as 
outlined in Appendix B), where high control risk is measured as the 
disclosure of a 404 material weakness and/or a 302 material weakness 
within the specific account grouping during year t, and zero 
otherwise; 
HighCR_otheraccts An indicator variable set equal to one if control risk is high within 
account groupings other than the account being examined (as outlined 
in Appendix B), where high control risk is measured as the disclosure 
of a 404 material weakness and/or a 302 material weakness within the 
specific account grouping during year t, and zero otherwise; 
ICMW An indicator variables set equal to one if a material weakness in 
internal control is present, and zero otherwise 
ICWeak_Acct An indicator if control risk is high (404 material weakness and/or 302 
material weakness) in any of the account/class of transactions 
groupings (outlined in Appendix B) during year t, and zero otherwise; 
INVREC Inventory and receivables divided by total assets; 
LateDisclose An indicator variable set equal to one if an account level material 
weakness was disclosed under Section 404 in the annual report, but 
no Section 302 disclosure was made for that particular account in any 
of the interim quarterly filings during the year, and zero otherwise; 
LEV Long-term debt plus the current portion of long-term debt divided by 
total assets; 
LnAFEE The natural log of audit fees; 
LnAssets The natural log of total assets; 
LnSEG The natural log of the number operating segments;  
Loss An indicator variable set equal to one if net income is less than zero, 
and zero otherwise; 
Mismatch_LargeAUD An indicator variable set equal to one if the company is misaligned 
with a large auditor based on the methodology in Shu (2000), where a 
large auditor is defined as a Big N auditor (PWC, KPMG, Deloitte, 
and Ernst & Young), and zero otherwise;  
Mismatch_SmallAUD An indicator variable set equal to one if the company is misaligned 
with a small auditor based on the methodology in Shu (2000), where a 
small auditor is defined as an auditor other than a Big N auditor, and 
zero otherwise; 
Misstate An indicator if there was a misstatement in year t, and zero otherwise; 
Misstate_acctspecific An indicator if the specific account grouping was misstated in year t, 
and zero otherwise; 
(Continued on next page) 
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MTB The market-to-book ratio, calculated as the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity;   
M&A An indicator variable set equal to one if the company is involved in a 
merger or acquisition during the year, and zero otherwise; 
OfficeImport The ratio of total company fees to the sum of total fees of all public 
clients of the auditor office issuing the audit report; 
OfficeSize The natural log of the sum of total fees of all public clients of the 
auditor office issuing the audit report; 
RESTATE An indicator variable set equal to one if a restatement was announced 
during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise; 
Restructure An indicator variable set equal to one if the company is involved in 
restructuring activity during the year, and zero otherwise; 
ROA Return on assets measured as net income divided by total assets; 
Specialist An indicator variable set equal to one if the auditor is an industry 
specialist (audit fee market share in the 2-digit SIC code exceeds 30% 
at the national level), and zero otherwise; 
StdROA The standard deviation of return on assets over the prior five years, 
where return on assets is net income divided by total assets;  
Tenure The number of consecutive years to date of the auditor-client 
relationship; 
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APPENDIX B 
ACCOUNT/CLASS OF TRANSACTIONS GROUPINGS 
 
The table below outlines the account/class of transaction groupings for both internal control 
weaknesses and restatements.  Groupings are based on the categorization in Audit Analytics 
 
Internal Control Weakness Restatement 
AA key Category AA key Category 
39 Revenue recognition issues 6 Revenue recognition issues 
32 Inventory, vendor and cost of sales 
issues 
20 Inventory, vendor and cost of sales 
issues 
29, 14, 
28 
Expense recording (payroll, 
SG&A) issues, capitalization of 
expenditures issues, depreciation, 
depletion or amortization issues 
7, 23, 1 Expense recording (payroll, 
SG&A) issues, capitalization of 
expenditures issues, depreciation, 
depletion or amortization issues 
15 Accounts/loans receivable, 
investments & cash issues 
14 Accounts/loans receivable, 
investments & cash issues 
3, 73 Lease, FAS 5, legal, contingency 
& commitment issues (including 
lease, leasehold & FAS 13 (98) 
subcategory) 
21, 42 Lease, FAS 5, legal, contingency & 
commitment issues (including 
lease, leasehold & FAS 13 (98) 
subcategory) 
27 Deferred, stock-based and/or 
executive comp issues  
17, 48 Deferred, stock-based and/or 
executive comp issues (including 
deferred, stock-based options 
backdating only subcategory) 
30 Financial derivatives/hedging 
(FAS 133) accounting issues 
8 Financial derivatives/hedging (FAS 
133) accounting issues 
33 Liabilities, payables, reserves and 
accrual estimate failures 
12 Liabilities, payables, reserves and 
accrual estimate failures 
41 Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other 
(FAS 109) issues 
18 Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other 
(FAS 109) issues 
47 Debt, quasi-debt, warrants & 
equity security issues 
4 Debt, quasi-debt, warrants & 
equity security issues 
80 Pension and other post-retirement 
benefit issues 
69 Pension and other post-retirement 
benefit issues 
16 Property, plant & equipment, 
intangible or fixed asset 
(value/diminution) issue 
3, 46 Property, plant & equipment, 
intangible or fixed asset 
(value/diminution) issue (including 
intangible assets, goodwill only 
subcategory) 
35 Acquisition, merger, disposal or 
reorganization issues 
10, 45 Acquisition, merger, disposal or 
reorganization issues (including 
acquisitions, mergers, only 
subcategory) 
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APPENDIX C 
COMPANY-SPECIFIC INTERNAL CONTROL DISCLOSURES 
 
Example 1: 
 
“The Company did not have effective controls and procedures designed to provide reasonable 
assurance that stock-based compensation related to grants of stock-based awards was 
accurately and properly recorded in the general ledger and financial statements. As a result of 
this material weakness, material adjustments were necessary to present the accompanying 
consolidated financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 
These adjustments had the effect of materially increasing stock-based compensation and 
decreasing additional paid-in capital.  Inadequate resources and technical accounting expertise. 
The Company’s resources and level of technical accounting expertise within the accounting 
function were insufficient to properly evaluate and account for non-routine or complex 
transactions. Consequently, the Company’s controls over the selection and application of 
accounting policies in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles were 
inadequate and constitute a material weakness in the design of internal control over financial 
reporting. 
 
Audit Analytics coded internal control material weaknesses in the following categories: 
AA key 32: Deferred, stock-based and/or executive comp issues  
 
Example 2: 
 
“As of November 30, 2004, the Company did not maintain effective control over the valuation 
of certain inventory and cost of goods sold.  Specifically, the Company did not have effective 
supervisory and review controls over the valuation of certain inventory and application of 
production variances. This control deficiency resulted in audit adjustments to the fourth 
quarter 2004 financial statements. Additionally, this control deficiency could result in a 
misstatement of inventory and cost of goods sold that would result in a material misstatement 
to annual or interim financial statements that would not be prevented or detected if left 
unremediated. Accordingly, management determined that this control deficiency constitutes a 
material weakness.” 
 
Audit Analytics coded internal control material weaknesses in the following categories: 
AA key 32: Inventory, vendor and cost of sales issues 
 
(Continued on next page) 
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Example 3: 
 
“Management has concluded that our internal controls over financial reporting were not 
effective as of December 31, 2008 due to the following: Entity level controls, The Company’s 
activity level controls are ineffective relating to certain accounts, revenue recognition, 
purchasing, accounts payable, inventory, and financial closing. Ineffective internal controls 
relating to these accounts may affect the financial statements and will directly affect the nature 
and timing of other auditing procedures for certain activities.” 
 
Audit Analytics coded internal control material weaknesses in the following categories: 
AA key 32: Inventory, vendor and cost of sales issues 
AA key 33: Liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual estimate failures 
AA key 39: Revenue recognition issues 
 
Example 4 (interim disclosure only): 
 
“Management, through documentation, testing and assessment of our internal control over 
financial reporting pursuant to the rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Item 308 of Regulation 
S-K, has concluded that our internal control over financial reporting had a material weakness 
in accounting for income taxes as of March 31, 2008.” 
 
Audit Analytics coded internal control material weaknesses in the following categories: 
AA key 41: Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other (FAS 109) issues 
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Figures 1a – 1f 
Graphs of Interaction Effects against Predicted Probabilities of Misstatement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 1a: Revenue 
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Figures 1a – 1f 
Graphs of Interaction Effects against Predicted Probabilities of Misstatement 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1b: Inventory 
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Figures 1a – 1f 
Graphs of Interaction Effects against Predicted Probabilities of Misstatement 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 1c: Expense 
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Figures 1a – 1f 
Graphs of Interaction Effects against Predicted Probabilities of Misstatement 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 1d: Payables/Reserves 
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Figures 1a – 1f 
Graphs of Interaction Effects against Predicted Probabilities of Misstatement 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1e: PPE/Intangibles 
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Figures 1a – 1f 
Graphs of Interaction Effects against Predicted Probabilities of Misstatement 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1f: M&A, Purchase Acct 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection and Composition 
 
 N 
Sample 
Observations with an auditor’s opinion on internal controls and necessary data after Audit Analytics and Compustat merge (2004-2009) 
 
22,253 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Sample 22,253 22,253 22,253 22,253 22,253 22,253 22,253 22,253 22,253 22,253 22,253 22,253 22,253 
Less observations with ‘0’ or 
missing Compustat variables: 
             
REVT (384)             
INVT and COGS  (388)            
CHE    (153)          
DCLO and XRENT     (3,920)         
STKCO and OPTFVGR and 
OPTPRCEY 
      
(1,249) 
       
CIDERGL and HEDGEGL       (14,406)       
AP and XACC        (444)      
XPR and CIPEN and PNCA and 
PRCA 
           
(4,240) 
  
PPENT and INTAN            (860)  
AQP             (20,038) 
Final Samples by Account Grouping 21,869 21,865 22,253 22,100 18,333 21,004 7,847 21,809 22,253 22,253 18,013 21,393 2,215 
Table columns represent the following account-specific groupings: 
(1) Revenue recognition issues 
(2) Inventory and cost of sales issues 
(3) Expense recording issues 
(4) Accounts/loans receivable, investments and cash issues 
(5) Lease related issues 
(6) Deferred, stock-based and/or executive compensation issues 
(7) Derivatives/hedging issues 
 
(8) Liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual estimate failures 
(9) Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other issues 
(10) Debt, quasi-debt, warrants and equity security issues 
(11) Pension and other post-employment benefit issues 
(12) Value/diminution issues related to intangible or fixed assets 
(13) Acquisition, merger, disposal or reorganization issues 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 1 cont’d 
Misstatements and ICM weakness by Account/ Class of Transaction Grouping 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
(11) 
 
(12) 
 
(13) 
Total 
  Obs. 
N 21,869 21,865 22,253 22,100 18,333 21,004 7,847 21,809 22,253 22,253 18,013 21,393 2,215 22,253 
               
(1) ICM weakness 
(302 or 404)  
 
918 
 
786 
 
670 
 
865 
 
421 
 
496 
 
255 
 
898 
 
1,036 
 
282 
 
73 
 
660 
 
429 
 
2,606 
               
(2) Misstatements 208 108 201 132 91 307 84 174 272 91 40 96 128 1,346 
               
(3) Misstatements with 
a related ICM weakness  
 
43 
 
22 
 
26 
 
22 
 
22 
 
44 
 
24 
 
31 
 
56 
 
11 
 
1 
 
18 
 
13 
 
240 
               
Account level 
misstatements with 
assessed ICM weakness 
              
Row (3) / Row (1) 4.7% 2.8% 4.0% 2.7% 5.5% 9.4% 10.3% 3.6% 5.6% 4.2% 1.5% 2.8% 3.2% 9.2% 
Account level 
misstatements without 
assessed ICM weakness 
              
(Row (2) - (3)) /  
(N - Row (1)) 
 
0.8% 
 
0.4% 
 
0.8% 
 
0.5% 
 
0.4% 
 
1.3% 
 
0.8% 
 
0.7% 
 
1.0% 
 
0.4% 
 
0.2% 
 
0.4% 
 
6.4% 
 
5.6% 
Table columns represent the following account-specific groupings: 
(1) Revenue recognition issues 
(2) Inventory and cost of sales issues 
(3) Expense recording issues 
(4) Accounts/loans receivable, investments and cash issues 
(5) Lease related issues 
(6) Deferred, stock-based and/or executive compensation issues 
(7) Derivatives/hedging issues 
 
(8) Liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual estimate failures 
(9) Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other issues 
(10) Debt, quasi-debt, warrants and equity security issues 
(11) Pension and other post-employment benefit issues 
(12) Value/diminution issues related to intangible or fixed assets 
(13) Acquisition, merger, disposal or reorganization issues 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
St. Dev. 
25th 
Percentile 
 
Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Misstate 22,253 0.060 0.238 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ICWeak_Acct 22,253  0.123 0.329 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AuditFeeAdj 22,253  0.031 0.618 -0.371 0.028 0.426 
LnAssets 22,253  7.004 1.977 5.650 6.896 8.185 
LEV 22,253  0.568 0.384 0.342 0.552 0.766 
MTB 22,253  6.658 321.558 1.215 1.918 3.192 
FIN 22,253  0.155 0.500 0.007 0.039 0.162 
Loss 22,253  0.271 0.444 0.000 0.000 1.000 
StdROA 22,253  0.126 1.194 0.012 0.031 0.087 
LnSEG 22,253  0.216 0.713 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FOROPS 22,253  0.283 0.450 0.000 0.000 1.000 
M&A 22,253  0.078 0.268 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Restructure 22,253  0.261 0.439 0.000 0.000 1.000 
EntityICweak 22,253  0.084 0.278 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BigN 22,253  0.815 0.388 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Specialist 22,253  0.235 0.424 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 3 
Correlations 
 
Sample (N=22,253) 
 
 
 
Variables 
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Misstate  0.196 0.038 -0.028 -0.002 -0.003 0.015 0.009 0.001 0.010 -0.015 -0.011 0.026 0.193 0.016 0.008 
ICWeak_Acct 0.196  0.138 -0.119 0.017 -0.005 0.015 0.143 0.029 -0.010 0.042 -0.008 0.068 0.739 -0.075 -0.021 
AuditFeeAdj 0.038 0.144  0.082 0.009 -0.003 -0.004 -0.024 0.005 -0.006 0.067 -0.007 0.001 0.092 0.008 0.004 
LnAssets -0.031 -0.128 0.030  0.246 -0.010 -0.072 -0.301 -0.114 0.208 0.076 0.108 0.105 -0.108 0.300 0.158 
LEV -0.010 -0.009 -0.022 0.467  0.005 0.123 0.041 0.025 0.029 -0.101 0.021 0.032 0.023 -0.026 0.013 
MTB 0.027 -0.026 0.063 -0.125 -0.192  0.001 -0.008 0.005 -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004 -0.020 -0.006 
FIN 0.041 0.009 0.001 0.029 0.115 0.087  0.075 0.050 -0.007 -0.039 0.001 -0.030 0.015 -0.023 -0.021 
Loss 0.009 0.143 -0.021 -0.307 -0.012 -0.174 0.089  0.083 -0.055 0.028 -0.003 0.138 0.133 -0.071 -0.033 
StdROA 0.039 0.141 0.150 -0.528 -0.385 0.119 0.042 0.474  -0.014 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 0.030 -0.046 -0.020 
LnSEG 0.014 -0.003 0.001 0.192 0.050 -0.002 0.029 -0.054 -0.032  0.114 0.009 0.061 -0.012 0.109 0.083 
FOROPS -0.015 0.042 0.072 0.064 -0.140 0.021 -0.021 0.028 0.146 0.111  0.032 0.193 0.037 0.119 0.042 
M&A -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 0.105 0.039 -0.037 0.022 -0.003 -0.031 0.013 0.032  0.103 -0.015 0.028 -0.005 
Restructure 0.026 0.068 0.003 0.100 0.030 -0.052 -0.033 0.138 0.148 0.062 0.193 0.103  0.038 0.143 0.045 
EntityICweak 0.193 0.739 0.102 -0.115 0.000 -0.015 0.021 0.133 0.117 -0.006 0.037 -0.015 0.038  -0.073 -0.027 
BigN 0.016 -0.075 0.007 0.295 -0.015 0.065 0.021 -0.071 0.016 0.107 0.119 0.028 0.143 -0.073  0.263 
Specialist 0.008 -0.021 0.002 0.161 0.030 0.012 0.016 -0.033 -0.022 0.078 0.042 -0.005 0.045 -0.027 0.263  
Bolded correlations are significant at the 1 percent level.  Pearson correlations are above the diagonal and Spearman correlations are below the diagonal.  All 
variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 4 
Correlations between Excess Audit Fees and High Control Risk by Account 
 
  Pearson Spearman 
  Correlations Correlations 
    
HighCR_acctspecific N AuditFeeAdj AuditFeeAdj
Revenue recognition issues 21,869 0.109*** 0.116*** 
Inventory and cost of sales issues 21,865 0.086*** 0.094*** 
Expense recording issues 22,253 0.067*** 0.073*** 
Accounts/loans receivable, investments and 
cash issues 
 
22,100 
 
0.083*** 
 
0.086*** 
Lease related issues 18,333 0.048*** 0.046*** 
Deferred, stock-based and/or executive 
compensation issues 
 
21,004 
 
0.061*** 
 
0.067*** 
Derivatives/hedging issues 7,847 0.032*** 0.031*** 
Liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual 
estimate failures 
 
21,809 
 
0.102*** 
 
0.106*** 
Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other issues 22,253 0.098*** 0.105*** 
Debt, quasi-debt, warrants and equity 
security issues 
 
22,253 
 
0.029*** 
 
0.031*** 
Pension and other post-employment benefit 
issues 
 
18,013 
 
0.020*** 
 
0.022*** 
Value/diminution issues related to 
intangible or fixed assets 
 
21,393 
 
0.067*** 
 
0.070*** 
Acquisition, merger, disposal or 
reorganization issues 
 
2,215 
 
0.169*** 
 
0.178*** 
    
This table presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations between AuditFeeAdj and high 
control risk within specific account groupings.  *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk 
 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
Variable 
 
 
(1) 
Revenue 
(2) 
Inventory 
(3) 
Expense 
(4) 
Invest./Cash 
(5) 
Lease 
Intercept ? -4.493*** -5.431*** -3.850*** -5.048*** -4.415*** 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 1.031*** 1.041*** 0.528* 0.662* 1.807*** 
  (<.001) (.002) (.080) (.073) (<.001) 
LnAssets ? -0.079 -0.237*** -0.124* 0.073 -0.056 
  (.233) (.006) (.059) (.333) (.476) 
LEV ? 0.049 0.383* 0.042 0.096 0.387 
  (.789) (.054) (.637) (.444) (.301) 
MTB ? 0.000 -0.001 -0.002** 0.000 0.000 
  (.628) (.313) (.016) (.757) (.926) 
FIN ? 0.055 0.081 0.082* 0.048 0.071* 
  (.183) (.274) (.051) (.294) (.086) 
Loss ? -0.172 -0.083 0.343* 0.145 0.126 
  (.403) (.765) (.082) (.578) (.712) 
StdROA ? -0.120 -1.901* -0.129 0.008 -2.396* 
  (.594) (.051) (.419) (.755) (.074) 
LnSEG ? 0.175 0.024 0.101 0.116 0.181 
  (.174) (.910) (.459) (.424) (.265) 
FOROPS ? -0.357 0.004 -0.284 -0.351 -0.375 
  (.115) (.989) (.219) (.227) (.327) 
M&A ? 0.015 0.454 0.032 -0.001 0.517 
  (.960) (.187) (.923) (.998) (.251) 
Restructure ? 0.551*** 0.416 0.227 0.443* -0.140 
  (.004) (.163) (.269) (.098) (.658) 
BigN ? 0.565** 1.041** 0.241 0.034 0.822 
  (.049) (.019) (.444) (.927) (.186) 
Specialist ? -0.010 -0.170 0.264 -0.040 0.474 
  (.966) (.613) (.230) (.873) (.131) 
EntityICweak ? 0.834*** 0.224 0.347 0.246 0.210 
  (.001) (.435) (.204) (.397) (.629) 
HighCR_otheraccts ? -0.227 0.403 0.575** 0.731** 0.050 
  (.419) (.276) (.031) (.030) (.910) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included Included 
N  21,869 21,865 22,253 22,100 18,333 
Area under ROC curve 0.766 0.793 0.784 0.761 0.842 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 5 cont’d 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk 
 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
Variable 
 
 
(6) 
Stock Comp 
(7) 
Derivatives 
(8) 
Pay./Reserves 
(9) 
Tax 
Intercept ? -3.415*** -3.037*** -4.256*** -4.532*** 
  (<.001) (.004) (<.001) (<.001) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 1.652*** 1.991*** 0.919*** 1.408*** 
  (<.001) (<.001) (.002) (<.001) 
LnAssets ? -0.026 -0.145 -0.067 0.068 
  (.708) (.214) (.440) (.251) 
LEV ? -0.995 2.159*** 0.084 0.013 
  (.128) (<.001) (.761) (.906) 
MTB ? 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
  (.833) (.202) (.402) (.535) 
FIN ? -0.017 -0.130 -0.334 0.091** 
  (.847) (.551) (.373) (.014) 
Loss ? 0.073 -0.304 -0.198 0.004 
  (.681) (.501) (.428) (.984) 
StdROA ? 0.019 -7.850 -1.708** -0.037 
  (.257) (.139) (.024) (.655) 
LnSEG ? 0.089 0.050 -0.122 -0.078 
  (.502) (.782) (.404) (.569) 
FOROPS ? 0.160 0.623* -0.146 -0.085 
  (.378) (.085) (.610) (.668) 
M&A ? 0.003 -0.426 -0.068 -0.550* 
  (.990) (.390) (.844) (.094) 
Restructure ? 0.095 0.206 0.583** 0.315* 
  (.563) (.613) (.010) (.058) 
BigN ? 0.638** -0.653 0.282 -0.269 
  (.012) (.155) (.421) (.338) 
Specialist ? -0.498** 0.605** 0.075 0.387** 
  (.016) (.046) (.757) (.048) 
EntityICweak ? 0.531* 0.803* 0.476 0.266 
  (.063) (.099) (.157) (.328) 
HighCR_otheraccts ? -0.293 -0.612 0.314 -0.238 
  (.359) (.220) (.395) (.360) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included 
N  21,004 7,847 21,809 22,253 
Area under ROC curve 0.833 0.846 0.793 0.779 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 5 cont’d 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk 
 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
(10) 
Debt/Equity 
(11) 
Pension/ 
OPEB 
(12) 
Valuation 
PPE/Intan. 
(13) 
M&A/ 
Purchase Acct
Intercept ? -3.994*** -20.724*** -4.542*** 0.573 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (.451) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 1.321*** 0.061 1.275*** -1.863*** 
  (.002) (.956) (.002) (<.001) 
LnAssets ? -0.095 0.162 -0.116 -0.200** 
  (.297) (.283) (.225) (.037) 
LEV ? 0.293* 0.582 -0.056 -1.170** 
  (.053) (.201) (.728) (.028) 
MTB ? -0.002** 0.000 0.000 0.003 
  (.026) (.921) (.949) (.655) 
FIN ? 0.088** -0.982 0.004 -0.306 
  (.014) (.552) (.965) (.479) 
Loss ? 1.033*** 0.617 0.081 -0.227 
  (.003) (.175) (.794) (.439) 
StdROA ? -0.445 -0.993 0.003 -0.022 
  (.198) (.614) (.951) (.472) 
LnSEG ? 0.273 -0.067 0.371** 0.135 
  (.113) (.821) (.024) (.388) 
FOROPS ? -0.190 0.435 -0.394 0.148 
  (.575) (.295) (.249) (.627) 
M&A ? 0.207 -0.197 0.231  
  (.663) (.786) (.682)  
Restructure ? -0.554* 0.181 0.320 -0.021 
  (.096) (.686) (.292) (.935) 
BigN ? -0.530* 0.790 0.440 0.312 
  (.086) (.477) (.274) (.387) 
Specialist ? -0.155 0.977** 0.551* 0.685** 
  (.628) (.046) (.073) (.019) 
EntityICweak ? 0.945** 0.242 0.482 1.031*** 
  (.038) (.676) (.323) (.007) 
HighCR_otheraccts ? -0.002 0.933 0.254 -0.272 
  (.996) (.140) (.632) (.474) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included 
N  22,253 18,013 21,393 2,215 
Area under ROC curve 0.836 0.897 0.801 0.793 
This table presents regression results from estimating Model (1) separately by account grouping, 
in which the dependent variable takes on a value of one if a misstatement within the specific 
account grouping exists.  P-values are two-tailed and are reported below the coefficient 
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estimates.  *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are clustered by company.   All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  
 71 
 
Table 6 
Estimating Excess Audit Fees 
 
 2004 2005 2006 
Variables DV= LnAFEE DV= LnAFEE DV= LnAFEE 
Intercept -4.221*** -4.082*** -3.983*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
LnAssets 0.404*** 0.407*** 0.409*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
LnSEG 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.121*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
FOROPS 0.117*** 0.095*** 0.120*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
ROA -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Loss 0.096*** 0.086*** 0.122*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
INVREC -0.400*** -0.442*** -0.422*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
LEV 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** 
 (.009) (.169) (<.001) 
Delay -0.000** -0.000** -0.001*** 
 (.018) (.031) (<.001) 
Busy 0.093*** 0.022 0.019 
 (<.001) (.314) (.377) 
GC 0.478*** 0.368*** 0.348*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
BigN 0.467*** 0.525*** 0.495*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
RESTATE -0.207 0.136*** 0.056 
 (.255) (<.001) (.155) 
ACCEL 0.569*** 0.436*** 0.395*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
MTB -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (.242) (.185) (.525) 
Specialist 0.040* 0.057** 0.131*** 
 (.097) (.027) (<.001) 
Restructure 0.404*** 0.411*** 0.388*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
M&A 0.060 0.022 0.051 
 (.214) (.642) (.225) 
StdROA 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
 (.857) (.094) (.626) 
Industry FE Included Included Included 
(Continued on next page) 
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N 6,282 5,709 5,518 
Adj. R2 0.815 0.821 0.827 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 6 cont’d 
Estimating Excess Audit Fees 
 
 2007 2008 2009 
Variables DV= LnAFEE DV= LnAFEE DV= LnAFEE 
Intercept -3.873*** -3.787*** -3.663*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
LnAssets 0.422*** 0.403*** 0.401*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
LnSEG 0.097*** 0.113*** 0.105*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
FOROPS 0.166*** 0.202*** 0.153*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
ROA -0.003*** 0.003*** -0.009*** 
 (.002) (<.001) (<.001) 
Loss 0.131*** 0.140*** 0.048** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (.019) 
INVREC -0.476*** -0.470*** -0.477*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
LEV -0.000 0.004*** -0.001* 
 (.857) (<.001) (.069) 
Delay -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Busy -0.016 -0.028 -0.033 
 (.476) (.192) (.122) 
GC 0.319*** 0.238*** 0.212*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
BigN 0.498*** 0.491*** 0.468*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
RESTATE 0.047 0.032 -0.030 
 (.326) (.562) (.626) 
ACCEL 0.289*** 0.316*** 0.239*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
MTB 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (.442) (.546) (.169) 
Specialist 0.085*** 0.054** 0.068*** 
 (.002) (.032) (.007) 
Restructure 0.327*** 0.349*** 0.361*** 
 (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
M&A -0.023 0.108*** 0.108*** 
 (.566) (.004) (<.001) 
StdROA 0.002** -0.001 0.002*** 
 (.018) (.213) (.003) 
Industry FE Included Included Included 
(Continued on next page) 
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N 5,294 5,106 4,960 
Adj. R2 0.816 0.824 0.826 
This table presents regression results from estimating Model (2) separately by year.  The 
parameter estimates are saved and applied to the sample observations to determine a benchmark 
audit fee assuming no internal control weaknesses.  This benchmark audit fee is subtracted from 
actual audit fees to determine the excess audit fee adjustment related to internal control 
weaknesses.  P-values are two-tailed and are reported below the coefficient estimates.  *, **, *** 
denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered by company.   All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 7 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk: Incorporating Auditor 
Effort 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
Variable 
 
 
(1) 
Revenue 
(2) 
Inventory 
(3) 
Expense 
(4) 
Invest./Cash 
(5) 
Lease 
Intercept ? -4.454*** -5.346*** -3.880*** -5.069*** -4.462*** 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 1.340*** 1.242*** 0.798*** 0.596 1.961*** 
  (<.001) (<.001) (.009) (.131) (<.001) 
AuditFeeAdj ? 0.501*** 0.327 0.317** -0.080 0.194 
  (.006) (.243) (.039) (.670) (.424) 
HighCR_acctspecific
*AuditFeeAdj 
 
? 
 
-1.423*** 
 
-1.068** 
 
-1.507*** 
 
0.245 
 
-0.618 
  (.001) (.027) (.001) (.525) (.238) 
LnAssets ? -0.099 -0.252*** -0.124** 0.076 -0.059 
  (.127) (.006) (.048) (.327) (.459) 
LEV ? 0.072 0.377* 0.037 0.096 0.391 
  (.685) (.065) (.683) (.454) (.296) 
MTB ? 0.000 -0.001 -0.001** 0.000 0.000 
  (.636) (.291) (.040) (.757) (.926) 
FIN ? 0.036 0.068 0.072 0.050 0.064 
  (.389) (.357) (.101) (.278) (.131) 
Loss ? -0.162 -0.072 0.367* 0.146 0.143 
  (.430) (.798) (.062) (.574) (.675) 
StdROA ? -0.184 -2.008** -0.152 0.008 -2.490* 
  (.525) (.047) (.368) (.734) (.066) 
LnSEG ? 0.188 0.031 0.107 0.115 0.186 
  (.149) (.885) (.438) (.430) (.267) 
FOROPS ? -0.372* 0.001 -0.319 -0.348 -0.393 
  (.092) (.998) (.166) (.228) (.308) 
M&A ? 0.046 0.482 0.045 0.000 0.518 
  (.883) (.167) (.892) (.999) (.248) 
Restructure ? 0.569*** 0.427 0.217 0.443* -0.140 
  (.003) (.165) (.287) (.098) (.657) 
BigN ? 0.605** 1.043** 0.240 0.036 0.840 
  (.034) (.021) (.441) (.922) (.180) 
Specialist ? 0.003 -0.158 0.273 -0.043 0.476 
  (.991) (.634) (.214) (.865) (.126) 
EntityICweak ? 0.763*** 0.220 0.361 0.264 0.201 
  (.001) (.445) (.178) (.376) (.640) 
HighCR_otheraccts ? -0.247 0.353 0.491* 0.733** 0.023 
  (.360) (.314) (.067) (.034) (.958) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included Included 
(Continued on next page) 
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N  21,869 21,865 22,253 22,100 18,333 
Area under ROC curve 0.777 0.795 0.788 0.761 0.843 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 7 cont’d 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk: Incorporating Auditor 
Effort 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
Variable 
 
 
(6) 
Stock Comp 
(7) 
Derivatives 
(8) 
Pay./Reserves 
(9) 
Tax 
Intercept ? -3.412*** -3.003*** -4.127*** -4.435*** 
  (<.001) (.005) (<.001) (<.001) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 1.758*** 1.976*** 1.296*** 1.539*** 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
AuditFeeAdj ? 0.346** -0.044 0.668*** 0.403** 
  (.011) (.876) (<.001) (.012) 
HighCR_acctspecific
*AuditFeeAdj 
 
? 
 
-0.517 
 
0.284 
 
-1.471*** 
 
-0.601* 
  (.233) (.563) (.001) (.063) 
LnAssets ? -0.037 -0.150 -0.103 0.050 
  (.584) (.195) (.232) (.382) 
LEV ? -1.002 2.170*** 0.117 0.014 
  (.126) (<.001) (.664) (.898) 
MTB ? 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
  (.774) (.202) (.297) (.518) 
FIN ? -0.024 -0.134 -0.352 0.076* 
  (.752) (.544) (.366) (.064) 
Loss ? 0.080 -0.306 -0.184 0.007 
  (.654) (.503) (.458) (.975) 
StdROA ? 0.017 -7.952 -2.021** -0.054 
  (.422) (.144) (.014) (.619) 
LnSEG ? 0.107 0.051 -0.094 -0.066 
  (.417) (.782) (.528) (.633) 
FOROPS ? 0.139 0.626* -0.192 -0.117 
  (.438) (.087) (.491) (.556) 
M&A ? 0.019 -0.426 -0.045 -0.544* 
  (.942) (.394) (.898) (.098) 
Restructure ? 0.119 0.207 0.611*** 0.340** 
  (.464) (.609) (.007) (.038) 
BigN ? 0.668*** -0.648 0.333 -0.247 
  (.008) (.159) (.339) (.382) 
Specialist ? -0.498** 0.614** 0.094 0.391** 
  (.016) (.043) (.699) (.047) 
EntityICweak ? 0.514* 0.792* 0.419 0.247 
  (.064) (.092) (.203) (.356) 
HighCR_otheraccts ? -0.339 -0.629 0.226 -0.280 
  (.274) (.222) (.528) (.276) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included 
(Continued on next page) 
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N  21,004 7,847 21,809 22,253 
Area under ROC curve 0.837 0.845 0.809 0.783 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 7 cont’d 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk: Incorporating Auditor 
Effort 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
(10) 
Debt/Equity 
(11) 
Pension/ 
OPEB 
(12) 
Valuation 
PPE/Intan. 
(13) 
M&A/ 
Purchase Acct
Intercept ? -4.169*** -20.728*** -4.548*** 0.468 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (.536) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 1.380*** 0.133 1.548*** -1.504*** 
  (.001) (.904) (<.001) (<.001) 
AuditFeeAdj ? -0.339 -0.047 0.256 0.851*** 
  (.184) (.875) (.266) (.001) 
HighCR_acctspecific
*AuditFeeAdj 
 
? 
 
-0.871 
 
-0.515 
 
-1.669*** 
 
-2.005*** 
  (.235) (.618) (.004) (.002) 
LnAssets ? -0.083 0.169 -0.118 -0.231*** 
  (.312) (.294) (.207) (.006) 
LEV ? 0.281** 0.588 -0.058 -0.937* 
  (.025) (.189) (.720) (.088) 
MTB ? -0.002** 0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (.036) (.878) (.931) (.810) 
FIN ? 0.105*** -0.979 0.005 -0.226 
  (.005) (.554) (.953) (.581) 
Loss ? 1.027*** 0.617 0.092 -0.294 
  (.004) (.177) (.764) (.301) 
StdROA ? -0.392 -1.003 0.002 -0.038 
  (.140) (.608) (.979) (.238) 
LnSEG ? 0.257 -0.073 0.387** 0.137 
  (.129) (.816) (.018) (.407) 
FOROPS ? -0.144 0.441 -0.382 0.152 
  (.673) (.295) (.265) (.622) 
M&A ? 0.213 -0.206 0.248  
  (.654) (.779) (.660)  
Restructure ? -0.581* 0.174 0.316 0.082 
  (.083) (.701) (.287) (.749) 
BigN ? -0.551* 0.770 0.424 0.371 
  (.081) (.489) (.284) (.299) 
Specialist ? -0.126 0.978** 0.546* 0.620** 
  (.694) (.046) (.078) (.038) 
EntityICweak ? 0.998** 0.240 0.381 1.022*** 
  (.023) (.675) (.394) (.008) 
HighCR_otheraccts ? 0.056 0.949 0.301 -0.321 
  (.908) (.144) (.524) (.398) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included 
(Continued on next page) 
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Year FE  Included Included Included Included 
N  22,253 18,013 21,393 2,215 
Area under ROC curve 0.839 0.897 0.800 0.816 
This table presents regression results from estimating Model (3) separately by account grouping, 
in which the dependent variable takes on a value of one if a misstatement within the specific 
account grouping exists.  P-values are two-tailed and are reported below the coefficient 
estimates.  *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are clustered by company.   All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 8 
Analysis of the Interaction Effect 
 
This table presents the certain statistics produced by the INTEFF command in STATA to analyze the true interaction effect in a logistic regression model 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
 
 
(7) 
 
 
(8) 
 
 
(9) 
 
 
(10) 
 
 
(11) 
 
 
(12) 
 
 
(13) 
 
               
               
Mean interaction effect  -0.036 -0.014 -0.026 0.002 -0.014 -0.013 0.014 -0.027 -0.012 -0.020 -0.002 -0.034 -0.094  
Mean z-statistic -1.619 -1.172 -1.471 0.586 -0.704 -0.532 0.511 -1.408 -0.879 -1.039 -0.388 -1.270 -1.786  
               
Minimum interaction effect -0.261 -0.176 -0.308 0.000 -0.119 -0.084 0.000 -0.279 -0.128 -0.289 -0.114 -0.381 -0.431  
Maximum interaction effect -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.031 0.000 -0.000 0.065 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001  
 
Minimum z-statistic 
 
-3.187 
 
-2.304 
 
-3.038 
 
0.132 
 
-1.718 
 
-1.154 
 
0.022 
 
-2.676 
 
-1.769 
 
-2.262 
 
-0.674 
 
-4.521 
 
-5.564 
 
Maximum z-statistic -0.074 -0.025 -0.032 0.840 -0.024 -0.020 0.925 -0.031 -0.051 -0.029 -0.011 -0.134 -0.153  
               
Proportion of z-statistics in significant 
range (p-value<0.10)  
 
67.3% 
 
23.8% 
 
63.4% 
 
0.0% 
 
0.5% 
 
0.0% 
 
0.0% 
 
52.2% 
 
3.1% 
 
12.7% 
 
0.0% 
 
37.9% 
 
63.3% 
 
               
Table columns represent the following account-specific groupings: 
(1) Revenue recognition issues 
(2) Inventory and cost of sales issues 
(3) Expense recording issues 
(4) Accounts/loans receivable, investments and cash issues 
(5) Lease related issues 
(6) Deferred, stock-based and/or executive compensation issues 
(7) Derivatives/hedging issues 
 
(8) Liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual estimate failures 
(9) Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other issues 
(10) Debt, quasi-debt, warrants and equity security issues 
(11) Pension and other post-employment benefit issues 
(12) Value/diminution issues related to intangible or fixed assets 
(13) Acquisition, merger, disposal or reorganization issues 
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Table 9 
The Impact of Auditor Effort on the Effectiveness of Auditors’  
Response to High Control Risk 
 
Account groupings where true interaction effect is significant 
 
Account 
Grouping 
 
Level of 
AuditFeeAdj1 
 
Marginal Effect of 
HighCR_acctspecific
 
 
z-statistic 
 
 
p-value 
Revenue Very Low  0.0086*** 3.20 0.001 
 Low 0.0080*** 3.83 0.000 
 Mean 0.0062*** 3.81 0.000 
 High          0.0026 1.33 0.182 
 Very High         -0.0037 -0.86 0.392 
     
Inventory Very Low           0.0033** 2.55 0.011 
 Low 0.0029*** 3.08 0.002 
 Mean 0.0023*** 3.05 0.002 
 High          0.0012 1.35 0.177 
 Very High         -0.0003 -0.14 0.885 
     
Expense Very Low           0.0046** 2.16 0.031 
 Low          0.0035** 2.33 0.020 
 Mean          0.0018** 2.09 0.036 
 High         -0.0005 -0.48 0.630 
 Very High         -0.0038 -1.46 0.144 
     
Liabilities, Reserves, 
Accruals 
 
Very Low  
 
0.0039*** 
 
2.65 
 
0.008 
 Low 0.0040*** 3.25 0.001 
 Mean 0.0034*** 3.39 0.001 
 High          0.0013 0.93 0.352 
 Very High         -0.0032 -0.89 0.374 
     
Intangible/ Fixed 
Asset Valuation 
 
Very Low  
 
0.0063*** 
 
2.72 
 
0.006 
 Low 0.0051*** 3.36 0.001 
 Mean 0.0034*** 2.80 0.005 
 High          0.0012 0.79 0.431 
 Very High         -0.0017 -0.67 0.505 
     
M&A/ Purchase Acct Very Low            0.0097 0.73 0.464 
 Low          -0.0100 -0.89 0.374 
 Mean -0.0425*** -2.95 0.003 
 High -0.0932*** -3.49 0.000 
 Very High -0.1691*** -3.03 0.002 
(Continued on next page) 
 83 
 
For the account/ class of transactions groupings where the interaction term is significant, the 
table above presents the impact of high account-specific control risk on account-specific 
misstatements at various levels of auditor effort.  Specifically, presented below are the marginal 
effects of HighCR_acctspecific at various levels of AuditFeeAdj, holding fixed the value of all 
model  variables (except AuditFeeAdj) at their sample mean.  
1 – The mean is the sample mean value of AuditFeeAdj.  Very low (very high) represents two 
standard deviations below (above) the mean, and low (high) represents one standard deviation 
below (above) the mean.  *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 10 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk Using Distribution of 
Auditor Effort for Companies with Internal Control Weaknesses 
 
Account groupings where true interaction effect is significant 
 
Account 
Grouping 
 
Level of 
AuditFeeAdj1 
 
Marginal Effect of 
HighCR_acctspecific
 
 
z-statistic 
 
 
p-value 
Revenue Very Low  0.0083*** 3.57 0.000 
 Low 0.0073*** 4.00 0.000 
 Mean 0.0051*** 3.22 0.001 
 High          0.0012 0.49 0.626 
 Very High         -0.0053 -1.04 0.299 
     
Inventory Very Low           0.0031*** 2.86 0.004 
 Low 0.0027*** 3.21 0.001 
 Mean 0.0019*** 2.60 0.009 
 High          0.0009 0.78 0.433 
 Very High         -0.0006 -0.29 0.771 
     
Expense Very Low           0.0040** 2.27 0.023 
 Low          0.0028** 2.35 0.019 
 Mean          0.0010 1.34 0.182 
 High         -0.0013 -0.96 0.339 
 Very High         -0.0045 -1.51 0.131 
     
Liabilities, Reserves, 
Accruals 
 
Very Low  
 
0.0040*** 
 
3.00 
 
0.003 
 Low 0.0038*** 3.49 0.000 
 Mean 0.0028*** 2.74 0.006 
 High          0.0004 0.20 0.839 
 Very High         -0.0044 -1.04 0.297 
     
Intangible/ Fixed 
Asset Valuation 
 
Very Low  
 
0.0057*** 
 
3.11 
 
0.002 
 Low 0.0044*** 3.36 0.001 
 Mean          0.0027** 2.10 0.036 
 High          0.0005 0.28 0.781 
 Very High         -0.0023 -0.82 0.413 
     
M&A/ Purchase Acct Very Low            0.0031 0.25 0.800 
 Low          -0.0203* -1.74 0.081 
 Mean -0.0574*** -3.33 0.001 
 High -0.1138*** -3.40 0.001 
 Very High -0.1961*** -2.87 0.004 
(Continued on next page) 
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For the account/ class of transactions groupings where the interaction term is significant, the 
table above presents the impact of high account-specific control risk on account-specific 
misstatements at various levels of auditor effort.  Specifically, presented below are the marginal 
effects of HighCR_acctspecific at various levels of AuditFeeAdj, holding fixed the value of all 
model  variables (except AuditFeeAdj) at their sample mean.  
1 – The mean is the mean value of AuditFeeAdj for company-year observations with a material 
weakness in internal control.  Very low (very high) represents two standard deviations below 
(above) the mean, and low (high) represents one standard deviation below (above) the mean.  *, 
**, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 11 
The Effect of Internal Control Weaknesses on Audit Fees 
 
Variable DV= LnAFEE DV= LnAFEE DV= LnAFEE DV= LnAFEE
Intercept -3.772*** -3.800*** -3.734*** -3.758*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ICMW  0.388***  0.191*** 
  (<0.001)  (<0.001) 
COUNT_ICMW   0.127*** 0.093*** 
   (<0.001) (<0.001) 
LnAssets 0.438*** 0.441*** 0.440*** 0.440*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
LnSEG 0.096*** 0.095*** 0.092*** 0.093*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
FOROPS 0.217*** 0.212*** 0.218*** 0.215*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ROA 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.938) (0.989) (0.937) (0.947) 
Loss 0.128*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.101*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
INVREC -0.526*** -0.532*** -0.530*** -0.532*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
LEV 0.051** 0.044** 0.036* 0.036* 
 (0.015) (0.035) (0.085) (0.080) 
Delay 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (<0.001) (0.227) (0.137) (0.146) 
Busy -0.055*** -0.048** -0.045** -0.044** 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.027) (0.030) 
GC 0.162*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.119*** 
 (<0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BigN 0.435*** 0.450*** 0.445*** 0.449*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
(Continued on next page) 
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RESTATE 0.217*** 0.114*** 0.143*** 0.112*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
MTB 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Specialist 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Restructure 0.343*** 0.335*** 0.336*** 0.334*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
M&A 0.039** 0.038** 0.038** 0.038** 
 (0.043) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) 
StdROA 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.482) (0.482) (0.484) (0.484) 
     
Industry FE Included Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included Included 
     
N 22,253 22,253 22,253 22,253 
Adj. R2 0.714 0.721 0.722 0.723 
This table presents regression results estimating the effect of a material weakness in internal control, as well as the effect of multiple 
material weaknesses in internal control, on audit fees.  P-values are two-tailed and are reported below the coefficient estimates.  *, **, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by company.   All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 12 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk When Only One Account-
Level Material Weakness in Internal Controls Is Present 
 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
(1) 
Revenue 
 
(2) 
Inventory 
(3) 
Invest/ 
Cash 
(4) 
Stock 
Comp 
 
(5) 
Derivatives 
Intercept ? -4.193*** -6.316*** -4.939*** -3.352*** -2.942** 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (.023) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 1.640*** 0.569 2.101*** 2.742*** 2.140*** 
  (<.001) (.557) (.005) (<.001) (<.001) 
LnAssets ? -0.147* -0.290*** 0.061 -0.031 -0.165 
  (.057) (.005) (.474) (.704) (.251) 
LEV ? 0.015 0.426** 0.113 -1.026 2.311*** 
  (.959) (.035) (.493) (.223) (<.001) 
MTB ? -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
  (.410) (.009) (.808) (.613) (.483) 
FIN ? 0.020 0.088 0.065* 0.004 -0.067 
  (.806) (.344) (.051) (.932) (.585) 
Loss ? -0.181 0.021 0.173 -0.005 -0.484 
  (.460) (.951) (.573) (.980) (.399) 
StdROA ? -0.356 -2.050* -0.023 0.024 -12.266* 
  (.406) (.096) (.625) (.118) (.090) 
LnSEG ? 0.155 0.148 0.195 0.043 0.080 
  (.305) (.520) (.214) (.790) (.696) 
FOROPS ? -0.332 0.125 -0.024 0.290 0.651 
  (.216) (.698) (.939) (.147) (.110) 
M&A ? 0.214 0.753** -0.045 -0.169 -0.711 
  (.521) (.024) (.919) (.595) (.217) 
Restructure ? 0.642*** 0.558 0.289 0.139 0.410 
  (.006) (.110) (.359) (.461) (.363) 
BigN ? 0.604* 1.571** 0.131 0.734** -0.559 
  (.099) (.013) (.712) (.029) (.269) 
Specialist ? 0.046 -0.050 -0.106 -0.459** 0.514 
  (.861) (.896) (.722) (.039) (.132) 
EntityICweak ? 0.534 0.353 -0.367 0.164 1.265** 
  (.126) (.354) (.389) (.708) (.015) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included Included 
N  20,139 20,130 20,347 19,309 7,368 
Area under ROC curve 0.761 0.796 0.735 0.827 0.849 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 12 cont’d 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk When Only One Account-
Level Material Weakness in Internal Controls Is Present 
 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
(6) 
Pay/Reserves 
 
(7) 
Tax 
 
(8) 
Debt/Equity 
(9) 
Valuation 
PPE/Intan. 
Intercept ? -3.830*** -4.398*** -3.823*** -4.086*** 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 2.520*** 1.407*** 2.974*** 3.023*** 
  (<.001) (.003) (<.001) (<.001) 
LnAssets ? -0.109 0.055 -0.122 -0.293** 
  (.253) (.435) (.215) (.030) 
LEV ? 0.233 0.087 0.275 0.100 
  (.391) (.532) (.104) (.785) 
MTB ? -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
  (.037) (.227) (.161) (.932) 
FIN ? -0.510 0.090** 0.082** -0.344 
  (.154) (.018) (.024) (.477) 
Loss ? -0.406 -0.008 1.338*** 0.091 
  (.229) (.974) (<.001) (.798) 
StdROA ? -1.553* -0.144 -0.387 -0.099 
  (.094) (.634) (.334) (.677) 
LnSEG ? -0.170 -0.124 0.440** 0.514*** 
  (.312) (.477) (.011) (.003) 
FOROPS ? -0.094 -0.068 -0.111 -0.086 
  (.783) (.758) (.748) (.817) 
M&A ? -0.021 -0.959** -0.020 0.426 
  (.958) (.041) (.975) (.425) 
Restructure ? 0.715*** 0.240 -0.403 0.384 
  (.005) (.220) (.287) (.286) 
BigN ? 0.212 -0.529* -0.728** 0.643 
  (.566) (.083) (.044) (.187) 
Specialist ? 0.047 0.517** -0.086 0.500 
  (.864) (.019) (.823) (.152) 
EntityICweak ? 0.190 0.444 0.395 0.012 
  (.723) (.364) (.494) (.984) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included 
N  20,065 20,493 20,493 19,665 
Area under ROC curve 0.791 0.771 0.827 0.793 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 12 cont’d 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk When Only One Account-
Level Material Weakness in Internal Controls Is Present 
 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
(10) 
M&A/ 
Purchase Acct
   
Intercept ? 0.702    
  (.396)    
HighCR_acctspecific ? -1.420    
  (.199)    
LnAssets ? -0.273**    
  (.014)    
LEV ? -1.167**    
  (.043)    
MTB ? 0.002    
  (.789)    
FIN ? -0.474    
  (.432)    
Loss ? -0.070    
  (.836)    
StdROA ? -0.077    
  (.104)    
LnSEG ? 0.116    
  (.534)    
FOROPS ? 0.354    
  (.293)    
M&A ?     
      
Restructure ? -0.020    
  (.946)    
BigN ? 0.688    
  (.108)    
Specialist ? 0.582*    
  (.086)    
EntityICweak ? 1.164    
  (.130)    
Industry FE  Included    
Year FE  Included    
N  1,749    
Area under ROC curve 0.787    
This table presents regression results from estimating Model (1) separately by account grouping, 
in which the dependent variable takes on a value of one if a misstatement within the specific 
account grouping exists.  Samples are limited to only one account-level material weakness in 
internal controls, and as such, HighCR_otheraccts is excluded from the model.  I do not include 
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the results when the dependent variable is an expense related misstatement, a lease related 
misstatement, or a pension/OPEB related misstatement because high control risk within those 
particular accounts perfectly predicts the dependent variable (i.e., none of the observations with 
high control risk within the particular account have a misstatement within the same account).  P-
values are two-tailed and are reported below the coefficient estimates.  *, **, *** denotes 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered 
by company.   All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 13 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk When Only One Account-
Level Material Weakness in Internal Controls Is Present: Incorporating Auditor Effort 
 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
(1) 
Revenue 
 
(2) 
Inventory 
(3) 
Invest/ 
Cash 
(4) 
Stock 
Comp 
 
(5) 
Derivatives 
Intercept ? -4.166*** -6.273*** -4.948*** -3.368*** -2.783** 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (.023) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 1.804*** 0.475 1.913** 2.865*** 2.261*** 
  (<.001) (.626) (.010) (<.001) (<.001) 
AuditFeeAdj ? 0.526*** 0.310 -0.012 0.316** -0.077 
  (.005) (.293) (.949) (.031) (.807) 
HighCR_acctspecific
*AuditFeeAdj 
 
? 
 
-1.506** 
 
0.494 
 
1.381** 
 
-1.034** 
 
1.230* 
  (.034) (.262) (.049) (.022) (.053) 
LnAssets ? -0.169** -0.309*** 0.064 -0.043 -0.190 
  (.021) (.005) (.459) (.600) (.155) 
LEV ? 0.020 0.396* 0.106 -1.005 2.375*** 
  (.947) (.067) (.530) (.233) (<.001) 
MTB ? -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
  (.443) (.009) (.806) (.524) (.467) 
FIN ? 0.008 0.077 0.063* -0.009 -0.068 
  (.898) (.381) (.066) (.861) (.566) 
Loss ? -0.147 0.045 0.164 -0.004 -0.518 
  (.548) (.891) (.595) (.987) (.377) 
StdROA ? -0.552 -2.192* -0.023 0.024 -13.520* 
  (.287) (.077) (.630) (.203) (.091) 
LnSEG ? 0.183 0.165 0.196 0.059 0.090 
  (.227) (.479) (.214) (.711) (.655) 
FOROPS ? -0.365 0.115 -0.021 0.270 0.688* 
  (.163) (.717) (.947) (.173) (.096) 
M&A ? 0.220 0.781** -0.032 -0.165 -0.717 
  (.517) (.022) (.942) (.607) (.205) 
Restructure ? 0.687*** 0.599* 0.298 0.165 0.424 
  (.004) (.098) (.347) (.379) (.335) 
BigN ? 0.668* 1.643** 0.129 0.766** -0.513 
  (.064) (.011) (.716) (.024) (.307) 
Specialist ? 0.054 -0.039 -0.102 -0.459** 0.551 
  (.838) (.919) (.730) (.038) (.106) 
EntityICweak ? 0.459 0.328 -0.346 0.167 0.994* 
  (.184) (.381) (.419) (.697) (.088) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included Included 
(Continued on next page) 
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N  20,139 20,130 20,347 19,309 7,368 
Area under ROC curve 0.770 0.797 0.736 0.832 0.849 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 13 cont’d 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk When Only One Account-
Level Material Weakness in Internal Controls Is Present: Incorporating Auditor Effort 
 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
(6) 
Pay/Reserves 
 
(7) 
Tax 
 
(8) 
Debt/Equity 
(9) 
Valuation 
PPE/Intan. 
Intercept ? -3.604*** -4.256*** -3.862*** -4.065*** 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 3.336*** 1.475*** 2.964*** 2.541* 
  (<.001) (.002) (<.001) (.062) 
AuditFeeAdj ? 0.763*** 0.417** -0.337 0.246 
  (<.001) (.014) (.240) (.351) 
HighCR_acctspecific
*AuditFeeAdj 
 
? 
 
-2.796*** 
 
-0.504 
 
-0.551 
 
-4.235** 
  (.003) (.238) (.714) (.042) 
LnAssets ? -0.159* 0.029 -0.125 -0.236** 
  (.085) (.666) (.208) (.028) 
LEV ? 0.277 0.097 0.275* 0.046 
  (.298) (.543) (.083) (.905) 
MTB ? -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
  (.035) (.205) (.167) (.897) 
FIN ? -0.555 0.074* 0.097** -0.287 
  (.132) (.076) (.014) (.539) 
Loss ? -0.359 0.004 1.334*** 0.164 
  (.277) (.988) (<.001) (.643) 
StdROA ? -2.183** -0.229 -0.355 -0.141 
  (.038) (.560) (.333) (.681) 
LnSEG ? -0.126 -0.108 0.429** 0.502*** 
  (.460) (.535) (.013) (.006) 
FOROPS ? -0.189 -0.110 -0.067 -0.142 
  (.570) (.619) (.850) (.714) 
M&A ? 0.002 -0.949** -0.019 0.434 
  (.997) (.044) (.977) (.414) 
Restructure ? 0.775*** 0.275 -0.422 0.338 
  (.002) (.156) (.267) (.342) 
BigN ? 0.255 -0.491 -0.740** 0.591 
  (.487) (.111) (.047) (.213) 
Specialist ? 0.064 0.523** -0.073 0.534 
  (.818) (.018) (.849) (.133) 
EntityICweak ? 0.112 0.424 0.397 -0.076 
  (.830) (.366) (.501) (.911) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included 
(Continued on next page) 
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N  20,065 20,493 20,493 19,665 
Area under ROC curve 0.810 0.778 0.833 0.793 
(Continued on next page) 
  
 96 
 
Table 13 cont’d 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk When Only One Account-
Level Material Weakness in Internal Controls Is Present: Incorporating Auditor Effort 
 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
(10) 
M&A/ 
Purchase Acct
   
Intercept ? 0.629    
  (.481)    
HighCR_acctspecific ? -0.838    
  (.410)    
AuditFeeAdj ? 0.920***    
  (<.001)    
HighCR_acctspecific
*AuditFeeAdj 
 
? 
 
-2.151** 
   
  (.027)    
LnAssets ? -0.310***    
  (.001)    
LEV ? -0.977    
  (.107)    
MTB ? -0.001    
  (.920)    
FIN ? -0.358    
  (.554)    
Loss ? -0.071    
  (.828)    
StdROA ? -0.262    
  (.697)    
LnSEG ? 0.111    
  (.579)    
FOROPS ? 0.343    
  (.305)    
M&A ?     
      
Restructure ? 0.112    
  (.710)    
BigN ? 0.746*    
  (.077)    
Specialist ? 0.512    
  (.142)    
EntityICweak ? 1.011    
  (.152)    
Industry FE  Included    
Year FE  Included    
(Continued on next page) 
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N  1,749    
Area under ROC curve 0.820    
This table presents regression results from estimating Model (3) separately by account grouping, 
in which the dependent variable takes on a value of one if a misstatement within the specific 
account grouping exists.  Samples are limited to only one account-level material weakness in 
internal controls, and as such, HighCR_otheraccts is excluded from the model.  I do not include 
the results when the dependent variable is an expense related misstatement, a lease related 
misstatement, or a pension/OPEB related misstatement because high control risk within those 
particular accounts perfectly predicts the dependent variable (i.e., none of the observations with 
high control risk within the particular account have a misstatement within the same account).  P-
values are two-tailed and are reported below the coefficient estimates.  *, **, *** denotes 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered 
by company.   All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 14 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk: Censoring Low Auditor 
Effort for Companies with Account-Level Internal Control Weaknesses 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
Variable 
 
 
(1) 
Revenue 
(2) 
Inventory 
(3) 
Expense 
(4) 
Invest./Cash 
(5) 
Lease 
Intercept ? -4.464*** -5.366*** -3.881*** -5.073*** -4.449*** 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 1.294*** 1.210*** 0.769** 0.593 1.936*** 
  (<.001) (<.001) (.012) (.133) (<.001) 
AuditFeeAdj ? 0.501*** 0.247 0.289* -0.099 0.150 
  (.006) (.394) (.074) (.610) (.544) 
HighCR_acctspecific
*AuditFeeAdj 
 
? 
 
-1.234*** 
 
-0.905** 
 
-1.344*** 
 
0.245 
 
-0.533 
  (.001) (.032) (.002) (.511) (.278) 
LnAssets ? -0.099 -0.247*** -0.124** 0.076 -0.058 
  (.128) (.007) (.049) (.325) (.467) 
LEV ? 0.076 0.384* 0.036 0.095 0.392 
  (.667) (.056) (.690) (.458) (.294) 
MTB ? -0.000 -0.001 -0.001** -0.000 0.000 
  (.631) (.301) (.044) (.757) (.925) 
FIN ? 0.036 0.070 0.073* 0.051 0.065 
  (.387) (.352) (.097) (.276) (.124) 
Loss ? -0.159 -0.076 0.366* 0.145 0.140 
  (.436) (.789) (.063) (.577) (.680) 
StdROA ? -0.179 -1.965** -0.146 0.008 -2.454* 
  (.530) (.047) (.380) (.733) (.067) 
LnSEG ? 0.187 0.028 0.106 0.115 0.183 
  (.149) (.897) (.441) (.431) (.273) 
FOROPS ? -0.369* 0.003 -0.313 -0.347 -0.386 
  (.096) (.991) (.174) (.230) (.316) 
M&A ? 0.039 0.476 0.043 -0.001 0.519 
  (.900) (.172) (.896) (.999) (.248) 
Restructure ? 0.568*** 0.416 0.216 0.443* -0.145 
  (.003) (.173) (.291) (.099) (.645) 
BigN ? 0.610** 1.035** 0.242 0.036 0.833 
  (.033) (.022) (.439) (.923) (.184) 
Specialist ? 0.001 -0.162 0.271 -0.042 0.475 
  (.998) (.626) (.218) (.868) (.126) 
EntityICweak ? 0.764*** 0.226 0.373 0.262 0.211 
  (.001) (.428) (.165) (.380) (.624) 
HighCR_otheraccts ? -0.274 0.347 0.464* 0.749** 0.014 
  (.299) (.318) (.091) (.033) (.974) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included Included 
(Continued on next page) 
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N  21,869 21,865 22,253 22,100 18,333 
Area under ROC curve 0.777 0.794 0.788 0.761 0.842 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 14 cont’d 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk: Censoring Low Auditor 
Effort for Companies with Account-Level Internal Control Weaknesses 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
Variable 
 
 
(6) 
Stock Comp 
(7) 
Derivatives 
(8) 
Pay./Reserves 
(9) 
Tax 
Intercept ? -3.418*** -3.013*** -4.140*** -4.438*** 
  (<.001) (.005) (<.001) (<.001) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 1.721*** 1.984*** 1.263*** 1.473*** 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
AuditFeeAdj ? 0.351** -0.058 0.690*** 0.399** 
  (.011) (.836) (<.001) (.014) 
HighCR_acctspecific
*AuditFeeAdj 
 
? 
 
-0.403 
 
0.274 
 
-1.293*** 
 
-0.457* 
  (.298) (.550) (<.001) (.093) 
LnAssets ? -0.038 -0.148 -0.104 0.050 
  (.577) (.198) (.226) (.384) 
LEV ? -0.991 2.168*** 0.122 0.014 
  (.129) (<.001) (.648) (.896) 
MTB ? -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
  (.772) (.206) (.284) (.510) 
FIN ? -0.024 -0.134 -0.352 0.076* 
  (.749) (.542) (.363) (.064) 
Loss ? 0.080 -0.305 -0.178 0.009 
  (.653) (.502) (.472) (.966) 
StdROA ? 0.017 -7.933 -2.005** -0.054 
  (.416) (.145) (.014) (.620) 
LnSEG ? 0.106 0.050 -0.092 -0.065 
  (.421) (.783) (.537) (.639) 
FOROPS ? 0.141 0.627* -0.190 -0.116 
  (.431) (.086) (.495) (.562) 
M&A ? 0.018 -0.428 -0.041 -0.545* 
  (.944) (.392) (.907) (.098) 
Restructure ? 0.119 0.205 0.610*** 0.342** 
  (.467) (.613) (.007) (.037) 
BigN ? 0.672*** -0.648 0.339 -0.244 
  (.008) (.159) (.328) (.388) 
Specialist ? -0.498** 0.615** 0.091 0.387** 
  (.016) (.042) (.708) (.049) 
EntityICweak ? 0.523* 0.793 0.439 0.246 
  (.056) (.103) (.175) (.349) 
HighCR_otheraccts ? -0.365 -0.627 0.154 -0.288 
  (.234) (.227) (.663) (.255) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included 
(Continued on next page) 
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N  21,004 7,847 21,809 22,253 
Area under ROC curve 0.836 0.845 0.808 0.784 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 14 cont’d 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk: Censoring Low Auditor 
Effort for Companies with Account-Level Internal Control Weaknesses 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
(10) 
Debt/Equity 
(11) 
Pension/ 
OPEB 
(12) 
Valuation 
PPE/Intan. 
(13) 
M&A/ 
Purchase Acct
Intercept ? -4.146*** -20.637*** -4.547*** 0.387 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (.599) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 1.414*** 0.168 1.520*** -1.562*** 
  (.001) (.879) (<.001) (<.001) 
AuditFeeAdj ? -0.287 0.074 0.211 0.970*** 
  (.286) (.800) (.370) (<.001) 
HighCR_acctspecific
*AuditFeeAdj 
 
? 
 
-1.085 
 
-0.555 
 
-1.520*** 
 
-1.651*** 
  (.148) (.581) (.005) (.002) 
LnAssets ? -0.084 0.154 -0.117 -0.233*** 
  (.311) (.341) (.214) (.004) 
LEV ? 0.280** 0.577 -0.057 -0.899* 
  (.027) (.201) (.722) (.093) 
MTB ? -0.002** 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
  (.037) (.956) (.930) (.834) 
FIN ? 0.103*** -0.977 0.006 -0.225 
  (.006) (.554) (.941) (.585) 
Loss ? 1.026*** 0.622 0.092 -0.295 
  (.004) (.177) (.761) (.294) 
StdROA ? -0.399 -0.988 0.003 -0.037 
  (.140) (.616) (.960) (.247) 
LnSEG ? 0.259 -0.060 0.386** 0.133 
  (.126) (.848) (.019) (.420) 
FOROPS ? -0.154 0.435 -0.378 0.136 
  (.650) (.302) (.271) (.655) 
M&A ? 0.212 -0.186 0.246  
  (.657) (.799) (.663)  
Restructure ? -0.580* 0.191 0.314 0.106 
  (.085) (.670) (.292) (.680) 
BigN ? -0.522* 0.810 0.424 0.407 
  (.079) (.464) (.286) (.248) 
Specialist ? -0.123 0.981** 0.543* 0.610** 
  (.702) (.046) (.079) (.042) 
EntityICweak ? 0.984** 0.249 0.392 1.045*** 
  (.026) (.664) (.381) (.005) 
HighCR_otheraccts ? 0.079 0.903 0.283 -0.447 
  (.875) (.166) (.553) (.229) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included 
(Continued on next page) 
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Year FE  Included Included Included Included 
N  22,253 18,013 21,393 2,215 
Area under ROC curve 0.839 0.897 0.800 0.818 
This table presents regression results from estimating Model (3) separately by account grouping, 
in which the dependent variable takes on a value of one if a misstatement within the specific 
account grouping exists.  P-values are two-tailed and are reported below the coefficient 
estimates.  *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are clustered by company.   All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 15 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk: Excluding Companies with 
Internal Control Weaknesses and Low Auditor Effort 
 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
Variable 
 
 
(1) 
Revenue 
(2) 
Inventory 
(3) 
Expense 
(4) 
Invest./Cash 
(5) 
Lease 
Intercept ? -4.473*** -5.251*** -3.909*** -5.285*** -4.271*** 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 0.750*** 0.726* 0.009 0.685* 1.408*** 
  (.007) (.076) (.979) (.068) (.003) 
LnAssets ? -0.095 -0.257*** -0.123* 0.092 -0.77 
  (.188) (.004) (.067) (.231) (.346) 
LEV ? 0.183 0.428** 0.029 0.125 0.413 
  (.322) (.018) (.751) (.194) (.295) 
MTB ? -0.001 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.000 0.000 
  (.704) (.288) (.007) (.778) (.928) 
FIN ? 0.057 0.088 0.087** 0.062 0.086* 
  (.205) (.219) (.046) (.118) (.052) 
Loss ? -0.161 -0.103 0.435** 0.235 0.295 
  (.428) (.722) (.038) (.390) (.391) 
StdROA ? -0.676* -2.225** -0.124 0.003 -3.504* 
  (.082) (.049) (.445) (.917) (.055) 
LnSEG ? 0.138 0.053 0.118 0.109 0.184 
  (.297) (.801) (.402) (.474) (.283) 
FOROPS ? -0.244 0.100 -0.320 -0.251 -0.298 
  (.288) (.728) (.188) (.389) (.444) 
M&A ? 0.133 0.495 0.134 -0.030 0.375 
  (.668) (.148) (.686) (.941) (.451) 
Restructure ? 0.631*** 0.427 0.237 0.317 -0.154 
  (.002) (.169) (.241) (.243) (.646) 
BigN ? 0.581* 0.980** 0.273 0.120 0.827 
  (.060) (.024) (.373) (.731) (.186) 
Specialist ? -0.004 -0.194 0.239 -0.167 0.418 
  (.987) (.576) (.295) (.528) (.205) 
EntityICweak ? 0.866*** 0.097 0.605* 0.043 0.131 
  (<.001) (.781) (.066) (.903) (.789) 
HighCR_otheraccts ? -0.081 0.762* 0.555* 0.901** 0.337 
  (.793) (.084) (.097) (.023) (.481) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included Included 
N  21,209 21,200 21,566 21,417 17,795 
Area under ROC curve 0.767 0.792 0.786 0.753 0.837 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 15 cont’d 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk: Excluding Companies with 
Internal Control Weaknesses and Low Auditor Effort 
 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
Variable 
 
 
(6) 
Stock Comp 
(7) 
Derivatives 
(8) 
Pay./Reserves 
(9) 
Tax 
Intercept ? -3.457*** -2.774** -4.298*** -4.513*** 
  (<.001) (.014) (<.001) (<.001) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 1.288*** 2.074*** 0.673* 1.194*** 
  (<.001) (.001) (.076) (<.001) 
LnAssets ? -0.015 -0.181 -0.084 0.062 
  (.839) (.157) (.355) (.320) 
LEV ? -1.023 2.129*** 0.212 0.030 
  (.142) (<.001) (.376) (.736) 
MTB ? -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.000 
  (.580) (.058) (.508) (.545) 
FIN ? 0.005 -0.034 -0.433 0.090** 
  (.938) (.857) (.263) (.017) 
Loss ? 0.094 -0.158 -0.192 0.036 
  (.607) (.730) (.475) (.875) 
StdROA ? 0.018 -7.836 -1.784** -0.037 
  (.376) (.155) (.035) (.660) 
LnSEG ? 0.080 0.039 -0.117 -0.061 
  (.563) (.832) (.451) (.671) 
FOROPS ? 0.164 0.723** -0.097 -0.118 
  (.379) (.044) (.744) (.574) 
M&A ? -0.091 -0.964 -0.036 -0.658* 
  (.752) (.182) (.921) (.076) 
Restructure ? 0.051 0.219 0.545** 0.333* 
  (.770) (.594) (.019) (.056) 
BigN ? 0.617** -0.724 0.471 -0.337 
  (.019) (.121) (.157) (.235) 
Specialist ? -0.463** 0.753** 0.104 0.404** 
  (.029) (.020) (.683) (.049) 
EntityICweak ? 0.400 0.975* 0.576 0.401 
  (.239) (.079) (.172) (.207) 
HighCR_otheraccts ? 0.082 -0.907 0.301 -0.231 
  (.828) (.142) (.517) (.461) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included 
N  20,363 7,647 21,134 21,566 
Area under ROC curve 0.801 0.837 0.793 0.773 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 15 cont’d 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk: Excluding Companies with 
Internal Control Weaknesses and Low Auditor Effort 
 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
(10) 
Debt/Equity 
(11) 
Pension/ 
OPEB 
(12) 
Valuation 
PPE/Intan. 
(13) 
M&A/ 
Purchase Acct
Intercept ? -4.125*** -20.687*** -4.660*** 0.493 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (.543) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 1.051* 0.044 0.591 -2.302*** 
  (.054) (.970) (.202) (<.001) 
LnAssets ? -0.056 0.152 -0.116 -0.211** 
  (.517) (.326) (.242) (.035) 
LEV ? 0.261* 0.579 -0.145 -1.005* 
  (.053) (.164) (.626) (.079) 
MTB ? -0.002* 0.000 -0.000 0.002 
  (.074) (.830) (.622) (.780) 
FIN ? 0.086** -1.090 0.040 -0.344 
  (.014) (.551) (.453) (.487) 
Loss ? 1.178*** 0.742 0.114 -0.346 
  (<.001) (.106) (.730) (.278) 
StdROA ? -0.344 -1.097 -0.023 -0.028 
  (.235) (.634) (.836) (.375) 
LnSEG ? 0.297* -0.035 0.365** 0.054 
  (.078) (.908) (.034) (.759) 
FOROPS ? -0.195 0.300 -0.356 0.174 
  (.556) (.491) (.319) (.591) 
M&A ? -0.228 -0.023 0.339  
  (.714) (.975) (.548)  
Restructure ? -0.534 0.356 0.372 0.059 
  (.121) (.435) (.220) (.823) 
BigN ? -0.688** 0.844 0.486 0.306 
  (.033) (.441) (.239) (.428) 
Specialist ? -0.106 0.911* 0.689** 0.772** 
  (.750) (.073) (.029) (.012) 
EntityICweak ? 1.005** 0.493 0.176 1.025** 
  (.036) (.425) (.665) (.047) 
HighCR_otheraccts ? -0.185 0.767 0.901** -0.127 
  (.726) (.268) (.032) (.802) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included 
N  21,566 17,490 20,733 2,066 
Area under ROC curve 0.825 0.897 0.797 0.803 
This table presents regression results from estimating Model (1) separately by account grouping, 
in which the dependent variable takes on a value of one if a misstatement within the specific 
 107 
 
account grouping exists.  P-values are two-tailed and are reported below the coefficient 
estimates.  *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are clustered by company.   All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 16 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk: Excluding Companies with 
Internal Control Weaknesses and Low Auditor Effort 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
Variable 
 
 
(1) 
Revenue 
(2) 
Inventory 
(3) 
Expense 
(4) 
Invest./Cash 
(5) 
Lease 
Intercept ? -4.392*** -5.149*** -3.890*** -5.323*** -4.285 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 1.300*** 1.298*** 0.563 0.654 1.723** 
  (<.001) (.007) (.215) (.156) (.010) 
AuditFeeAdj ? 0.518*** 0.225 0.268 -0.112 0.132 
  (.005) (.429) (.103) (.567) (.596) 
HighCR_acctspecific
*AuditFeeAdj 
 
? 
 
-1.434*** 
 
-1.677** 
 
-1.630* 
 
0.069 
 
-0.736 
  (.009) (.023) (.064) (.900) (.465) 
LnAssets ? -0.119* -0.271*** -0.128* 0.096 -0.079 
  (.091) (.004) (.053) (.226) (.343) 
LEV ? 0.200 0.429** 0.035 0.126 0.396 
  (.302) (.021) (.704) (.202) (.330) 
MTB ? -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.000 0.000 
  (.755) (.351) (.015) (.779) (.931) 
FIN ? 0.038 0.078 0.076* 0.066 0.081* 
  (.386) (.285) (.096) (.105) (.074) 
Loss ? -0.157 -0.112 0.440** 0.234 0.296 
  (.444) (.707) (.036) (.391) (.386) 
StdROA ? -0.841* -2.342** -0.154 0.004 -3.581* 
  (.053) (.043) (.401) (.890) (.051) 
LnSEG ? 0.156 0.054 0.124 0.106 0.187 
  (.245) (.801) (.381) (.488) (.291) 
FOROPS ? -0.278 0.106 -0.346 -0.241 -0.318 
  (.220) (.711) (.151) (.407) (.419) 
M&A ? 0.159 0.503 0.139 -0.034 0.382 
  (.609) (.148) (.674) (.934) (.443) 
Restructure ? 0.658*** 0.434 0.248 0.313 -0.138 
  (.001) (.173) (.219) (.251) (.682) 
BigN ? 0.618** 0.967** 0.266 0.124 0.830 
  (.044) (.031) (.383) (.723) (.189) 
Specialist ? 0.007 -0.187 0.254 -0.165 0.427 
  (.978) (.585) (.268) (.531) (.189) 
EntityICweak ? 0.761*** 0.030 0.574* 0.035 0.077 
  (.003) (.932) (.084) (.924) (.882) 
HighCR_otheraccts ? -0.206 0.689 0.454 0.962** 0.327 
  (.486) (.113) (.181) (.021) (.497) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included Included 
(Continued on next page) 
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N  21,209 21,200 21,566 21,417 17,795 
Area under ROC curve 0.778 0.794 0.790 0.754 0.837 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 16 cont’d 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk: Excluding Companies with 
Internal Control Weaknesses and Low Auditor Effort 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
Variable 
 
 
(6) 
Stock Comp 
(7) 
Derivatives 
(8) 
Pay./Reserves 
(9) 
Tax 
Intercept ? -3.486*** -2.786** -4.148*** -4.417*** 
  (<.001) (.013) (<.001) (<.001) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 1.049*** 1.915*** 1.297*** 1.344*** 
  (.002) (.007) (.004) (<.001) 
AuditFeeAdj ? 0.287** -0.077 0.721*** 0.411** 
  (.044) (.786) (<.001) (.013) 
HighCR_acctspecific
*AuditFeeAdj 
 
? 
 
0.462 
 
0.375 
 
-1.413** 
 
-0.430 
  (.280) (.585) (.015) (.378) 
LnAssets ? -0.024 -0.180 -0.123 0.043 
  (.734) (.146) (.168) (.479) 
LEV ? -1.013 2.127*** 0.246 0.030 
  (.147) (<.001) (.296) (.734) 
MTB ? -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.000 
  (.528) (.060) (.348) (.524) 
FIN ? -0.003 -0.037 -0.460 0.074* 
  (.959) (.840) (.246) (.075) 
Loss ? 0.114 -0.163 -0.167 0.045 
  (.532) (.726) (.524) (.841) 
StdROA ? 0.016 -7.791 -2.199** -0.057 
  (.516) (.161) (.019) (.611) 
LnSEG ? 0.094 0.038 -0.084 -0.048 
  (.494) (.837) (.591) (.740) 
FOROPS ? 0.142 0.736** -0.160 -0.155 
  (.439) (.042) (.580) (.461) 
M&A ? -0.083 -0.970 -0.022 -0.646* 
  (.774) (.183) (.952) (.082) 
Restructure ? 0.078 0.219 0.592** 0.359** 
  (.646) (.593) (.011) (.036) 
BigN ? 0.667** -0.719 0.499 -0.306 
  (.011) (.122) (.133) (.287) 
Specialist ? -0.459** 0.747** 0.121 0.409** 
  (.029) (.021) (.637) (.047) 
EntityICweak ? 0.436 0.994* 0.488 0.370 
  (.169) (.066) (.239) (.229) 
HighCR_otheraccts ? -0.041 -0.881 0.063 -0.341 
  (.908) (.149) (.886) (.255) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included 
Year FE  Included Included Included Included 
(Continued on next page) 
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N  20,363 7,647 21,134 21,566 
Area under ROC curve 0.804 0.837 0.809 0.778 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 16 cont’d 
The Effectiveness of Auditors’ Response to High Control Risk: Excluding Companies with 
Internal Control Weaknesses and Low Auditor Effort 
 DV=Misstate_acctspecific 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
(10) 
Debt/Equity 
(11) 
Pension/ 
OPEB 
(12) 
Valuation 
PPE/Intan. 
(13) 
M&A/ 
Purchase Acct
Intercept ? -4.221*** -20.616*** -4.628*** 0.257 
  (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (.735) 
HighCR_acctspecific ? 0.688 0.885 1.213** -1.614*** 
  (.321) (.578) (.019) (.009) 
AuditFeeAdj ? -0.299 0.120 0.153 1.008*** 
  (.271) (.692) (.529) (<.001) 
HighCR_acctspecific
*AuditFeeAdj 
 
? 
 
0.945 
 
-3.906 
 
-1.906* 
 
-1.617* 
  (.299) (.228) (.052) (.066) 
LnAssets ? -0.050 0.139 -0.120 -0.246*** 
  (.563) (.403) (.230) (.003) 
LEV ? 0.262** 0.567 -0.149 -0.706 
  (.038) (.176) (.630) (.208) 
MTB ? -0.002* 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
  (.082) (.831) (.717) (.905) 
FIN ? 0.099*** -1.043 0.033 -0.254 
  (.007) (.570) (.558) (.607) 
Loss ? 1.182*** 0.737 0.095 -0.412 
  (.001) (.121) (.774) (.170) 
StdROA ? -0.313 -1.119 -0.027 -0.043 
  (.230) (.641) (.813) (.213) 
LnSEG ? 0.289* -0.022 0.368** 0.023 
  (.091) (.943) (.033) (.878) 
FOROPS ? -0.171 0.310 -0.347 0.159 
  (.612) (.487) (.332) (.616) 
M&A ? -0.226 -0.018 0.334  
  (.716) (.981) (.554)  
Restructure ? -0.557 0.376 0.372 0.205 
  (.109) (.408) (.216) (.435) 
BigN ? -0.689** 0.862 0.461 0.411 
  (.036) (.429) (.261) (.278) 
Specialist ? -0.110 0.931* 0.700** 0.719** 
  (.740) (.072) (.027) (.021) 
EntityICweak ? 1.047** 0.513 0.090 0.980** 
  (.037) (.404) (.822) (.039) 
HighCR_otheraccts ? -0.088 0.698 0.901** -.0.413 
  (.881) (.330) (.032) (.380) 
Industry FE  Included Included Included Included 
(Continued on next page) 
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Year FE  Included Included Included Included 
N  21,566 17,490 20,733 2,066 
Area under ROC curve 0.830 0.897 0.795 0.828 
This table presents regression results from estimating Model (3) separately by account grouping, 
in which the dependent variable takes on a value of one if a misstatement within the specific 
account grouping exists.  P-values are two-tailed and are reported below the coefficient 
estimates.  *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are clustered by company.   All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 17 
Determinants of an Ineffective Response to High Control Risk 
 
Note: The dependent variable equals one if there is a misstatement and internal control 
weakness within the same account grouping  
  
 
 
Pr(Misstate_acctspecificit=1 | 
HighCR_acctspecificit=1) 
 
 
Variable Prediction Coefficient Estimate p-value  
Intercept ? -4.406 0.068 * 
LnAssets ? -0.003 0.948  
OfficeImport ?  0.043 0.925  
LnSEG +  0.148 0.064 * 
M&A + -0.181 0.734  
Restructure +  0.155 0.173  
BigN -  0.789 0.994  
Specialist -  0.240 0.913  
Tenure - -0.002 0.432  
OfficeSize ?  0.024 0.747  
AUD_WLC ? -0.372 0.142  
Mismatch_LargeAUD ?  0.012 0.976  
Mismatch_SmallAUD +  0.467 0.074 * 
EntityICweak +  0.557 0.001 *** 
LateDisclose +  1.540 <0.001 *** 
ChgDeadline ? -0.038 0.865  
CloseToDeadline ? -0.355 0.037 ** 
     
N    2,585   
N where Misstatement is linked 
with IC weakness 
  
     240 
  
Pseudo R2      0.065   
Area under the ROC curve     0.673   
     
This table presents regression results from estimating Model (4).  P-values are two-tailed unless 
a prediction is made.  *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered by company.   All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. 
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Table 18 
Account Level Audit Failure by Industry and by Year 
 
Panel A: Account Level Audit Failure by Industry 
   
Industry Groupings:   
Computers (SIC codes 3570-3579; 3670-3679; 7370-7379) 73  
Financial (SIC codes 6000-6999) 30  
Durable manufacturers (SIC codes 3000-3999, excluding 3570-
3579 and 3670-3679) 
 
26 
 
Retail (SIC codes 5000-5999) 25  
Services (SIC codes 7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379) 17  
Transportation (SIC codes 4000-4899) 15  
Textiles and printing/publishing (SIC codes 2200-2799) 11  
Mining and construction (SIC codes 1000-1999) 10  
Extractive (SIC codes 1300-1399; 2900-2999) 9  
Pharmaceuticals (SIC codes 2830-2836) 7  
Utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) 7  
Chemicals (SIC codes 2800-2824; 2840-2899) 6  
Food (SIC codes 2000-2111) 4  
 240  
   
Panel B: Account Level Audit Failure by Year   
   
2004 71  
2005 75  
2006 48  
2007 25  
2008 20  
2009 1  
 240  
   
Account level audit failures represent company-year observations where control risk was 
assessed as high and a misstatement existed in the audited account. 
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Table 19 
Determinants of an Ineffective Response to High Control Risk by Account 
 
 DV= Pr(Misstate_acctspecificit=1 | HighCR_acctspecificit=1) 
 
Variable 
 
 
(1) 
Revenue 
(2) 
Inventory 
(3) 
Expense 
(4) 
Invest./Cash 
(5) 
Lease 
Intercept ? -3.401 3.274 -3.824 -6.449 -3.895 
  (.473) (.667) (.684) (.405) (.703) 
LnAssets ? 0.271** 0.196 0.048 0.135 0.011 
  (.039) (.175) (.785) (.403) (.955) 
OfficeImport ? 0.373 0.391 -2.390 0.364 -2.822 
  (.572) (.559) (.244) (.762) (.245) 
LnSEG + 0.332** -0.220 -0.114 -0.114 0.161 
  (.039) (.427) (.628) (.634) (.307) 
M&A + -1.045 -12.152 -0.663 -0.662 0.082 
  (.832) (.999) (.727) (.718) (.473) 
Restructure + 0.575* -0.094 0.516 0.060 -0.380 
  (.071) (.574) (.189) (.450) (.729) 
BigN - 1.742 1.273 0.241 1.784 0.867 
  (.975) (.881) (.570) (.932) (.683) 
Specialist - 0.070 -0.439 0.248 0.017 0.836 
  (.563) (.259) (.675) (.511) (.931) 
Tenure - 0.020 0.054 -0.036 0.002 -0.005 
  (.848) (.985) (.140) (.525) (.437) 
OfficeSize ? -0.177 -0.348 -0.016 0.024 -0.008 
  (.290) (.180) (.958) (.928) (.982) 
AUD_WLC ? -0.117 -0.082 1.232* -0.885 -0.308 
  (.842) (.927) (.086) (.260) (.686) 
Mismatch_LargeAUD ? 0.698 1.749    
  (.422) (.131)    
Mismatch_SmallAUD + 1.157* -0.026 -0.640 1.563** 0.697 
  (.086) (.510) (.681) (.036) (.305) 
EntityICweak + 2.104*** 1.196*** 0.325 0.399 0.614 
  (.002) (.004) (.230) (.258) (.131) 
LateDisclose + 2.462*** 2.647*** 1.537*** -0.025 2.653*** 
  (<.001) (<.001) (.002) (.511) (.001) 
ChgDeadline ? 0.223 0.621 0.563 -0.295 -0.001 
  (.729) (.362) (.330) (.709) (.999) 
CloseToDeadline ? -0.114 -0.500 -0.413 -1.839* 0.324 
  (.788) (.459) (.478) (.075) (.568) 
N  913 777 596 780 380 
Area under ROC curve 0.829 0.812 0.683 0.724 0.763 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 19 cont’d 
Determinants of an Ineffective Response to High Control Risk by Account 
 
 DV= Pr(Misstate_acctspecificit=1 | 
HighCR_acctspecificit=1) 
 
Variable 
 
 
(6) 
Stock Comp 
(7) 
Derivatives 
(8) 
Pay./Reserves 
(9) 
Tax 
Intercept ? 2.921 -8.109 -4.562 -9.594* 
  (.689) (.258) (.493) (.099) 
LnAssets ? -0.210 -0.072 0.246* -0.029 
  (.162) (.644) (.070) (.821) 
OfficeImport ? -2.210 0.889 -1.248 0.300 
  (.351) (.533) (.421) (.801) 
LnSEG + -0.367 0.125 0.054 0.019 
  (.879) (.272) (.407) (.464) 
M&A + 0.747 0.512  -0.009 
  (.120) (.304)  (.506) 
Restructure + 0.293 0.305 -0.207 0.219 
  (.234) (.339) (.650) (.247) 
BigN - 0.804 -0.980 0.648 0.552 
  (.863) (.235) (.708) (.837) 
Specialist - -0.340 1.540 0.085 0.146 
  (.273) (.995) (.576) (.655) 
Tenure - 0.008 0.041 0.013 0.002 
  (.610) (.932) (.739) (.548) 
OfficeSize ? -0.121 0.185 -0.034 0.197 
  (.625) (.457) (.878) (.306) 
AUD_WLC ? -1.305* 0.068 -0.656 -0.364 
  (.056) (.944) (.374) (.543) 
Mismatch_LargeAUD ? 0.211    
  (.764)    
Mismatch_SmallAUD + -0.616 0.524 -0.751 -0.581 
  (.732) (.320) (.665) (.714) 
EntityICweak + -0.177 -0.025 0.868** 0.283 
  (.680) (.515) (.039) (.210) 
LateDisclose + 1.411** 3.178*** 2.070*** 1.321** 
  (.039) (<.001) (<.001) (.013) 
ChgDeadline ? -0.021 -0.183 0.126 -0.119 
  (.965) (.843) (.844) (.776) 
CloseToDeadline ? -0.378 -1.717** -0.409 0.213 
  (.401) (.041) (.409) (.477) 
N  465 222 760 951 
Area under ROC curve 0.768 0.824 0.742 0.662 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 19 cont’d 
Determinants of an Ineffective Response to High Control Risk by Account 
 
 DV= Pr(Misstate_acctspecificit=1 | 
HighCR_acctspecificit=1) 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
(10) 
Debt/Equity 
(11) 
Valuation 
PPE/Intan. 
(12) 
M&A/ 
Purchase Acct 
 
Intercept ? 1.807 -23.863* -17.134  
  (.879) (.061) (.164)  
LnAssets ? -0.146 -0.030 0.369  
  (.576) (.896) (.138)  
OfficeImport ? -0.802 -1.070 -2.553*  
  (.799) (.733) (.090)  
LnSEG +  0.218 0.089  
   (.231) (.395)  
M&A +  -0.429   
   (.651)   
Restructure + -0.819 -0.202 0.402  
  (.753) (.644) (.299)  
BigN - 0.125 0.008 -0.172  
  (.555) (.503) (.446)  
Specialist - 1.312 -0.724 1.473  
  (.904) (.166) (.984)  
Tenure - -0.054* 0.002 -0.015  
  (.095) (.528) (.379)  
OfficeSize ? -0.162 0.639 0.323  
  (.707) (.138) (.415)  
AUD_WLC ? 1.844 1.683* 1.158  
  (.147) (.092) (.525)  
Mismatch_LargeAUD ? 0.613    
  (.493)    
Mismatch_SmallAUD +  0.771 2.884***  
   (.240) (.002)  
EntityICweak + -0.667 -0.611 -0.578  
  (.735) (.812) (.754)  
LateDisclose + 1.939** 3.665*** 1.724**  
  (.026) (<.001) (.016)  
ChgDeadline ? -0.402 -0.768 -1.274  
  (.770) (.534) (.375)  
CloseToDeadline ? 0.092 -1.727* -1.033  
  (.913) (.074) (.355)  
N  210 610 387  
Area under ROC curve 0.752 0.831 0.866  
This table presents regression results from estimating Model (4) separately by account grouping, 
in which the dependent variable takes on a value of one if there is a misstatement and internal 
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control weakness within the same account grouping.  Certain variables are dropped in the models 
because they perfectly predict the dependent variable.  The model examining pensions/OPEB 
cannot run due to too many variables perfectly predicting the dependent variable.  P-values are 
two-tailed unless a prediction is made and are reported below the coefficient estimates.  *, **, 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors 
are clustered by company.   All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
